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C

hina is believed to have the world’s largest exploitable reserves of shale gas, however, several legal, regulatory, environmental, and investment-related hurdles will likely restrain its
exploitation. China’s capacity to face these hurdles successfully
and produce commercial shale gas will have a crucial impact on the
regional gas market and on China’s energy mix, as Beijing strives
to meet growing energy demand, and, at the same time, maintain a
certain level of resource autonomy by decreasing its reliance on
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imported oil and coal. The development of the unconventional
natural gas extractive industry would also provide China with further negotiating power to obtain more advantageously priced gas.
This article, which adopts a comparative perspective, underlines the trends taken from unconventional fuel development in
the United States, emphasizing their potential application to
China in light of recently signed product-sharing agreements
between qualified foreign investors and China. The wide range
of regulatory and enforcement problems in this matter are increased by an extremely limited liberalization of gas prices, lack
of technological development, and barriers to market access
curbing access to resource extraction for private investors. This
study analyzes the legal tools that can play a role in shale gas
development while assessing the new legal and fiscal policies
that should either be crafted or reinforced. It also examines the
institutional settings’ fragmentation and conflicts, highlighting
how processes and outcomes are indeed path dependent. These
issues are exacerbated by many concerns. One such concern is
related to the risk of water pollution deriving from mismanaged
drilling and fracturing. Another concern is the absence of adequate predictive evaluation regulatory instruments and industry
standards, entailing consequences for social stability and environmental degradation, which are inconsistent with the purposes of sustainable development. Moreover, the possibilities of cooperation and coordination (including through U.S.-China common initiatives), and the role of transparency and disclosure of
environmental data are assessed.
The significant growth in the production of natural gas from
shale formations constitutes one of the most important developments in the energy sector. This growth was made possible by the
reduction of production costs and overcoming of technological barriers. Recent advances in fracturing (also known as “fracking”)
and horizontal drilling technologies have led to a dramatic increase in shale gas production in the United States, which has
resulted in energy experts describing shale gas as a “bridge fuel”
to carbon-free renewable resources as the United States’ primary
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source of energy.1 The U.S. Energy Information Administration
(EIA)
*** This article is part of the West Virginia University Energy Institute and Multi-Disciplinary Center for Shale Gas Utilization (WV, USA). The research leading
to these results received funding from the People Programme (Marie Curie Actions) of the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013)
under REA grant agreement n°269327 Acronym of the Project: EPSEI (2011–
2015) entitled “Evaluating Policies for Sustainable Energy Investments: Towards
an Integrated Approach on National and International Stage”. Earlier drafts of
this paper were circulated in September 2013 as a gLAWcal Working Paper and
in December 2013 as a FEEM Working Paper and presented at the Colloquium
on Environmental Scholarship 2013, Vermont Law School (USA), at the Faculty
Workshops at University of Amsterdam Law School 2013 (Netherlands), at West
Virginia University, Eberly College of Arts and Sciences, Department of Public
Administration and College of Law (USA), at the Conference “Managing the
Globalization of Sanitation and Water Services: ‘Blue Gold’ Regulatory and Economic Challenges,” organized by the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Faculty of
Law, in cooperation with Maastricht University, Faculty of Law, University of
Sydney, School of Economics, University of Leeds, Business School, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, held at Chinese University of Hong
Kong, Faculty of Law, Hong Kong, March 23–24, 2015, Workshops and Lectures
at University of Macau and at Fundação Rui Cunha in Macao, March 25–26,
2015, the Workshop of the American Society of International Law, International
Economic Law Interest Group held at University of Pennsylvania, Wharton
School, Philadelphia, PA, January 29, 2016. A special thanks should be addressed to the participants in the above mentioned events as well as Nicholas
Ashford (MIT), Sachin Desai, Fernando Dias Simões (University of Macau, Faculty of Law), Sam Kalen (University of Wyoming College of Law), Rebecca Purdom (Vermont Law School), Siu Tip Lam (Vermont Law School), Sharon Jacobs
(University of Colorado Law School and Harvard Law School), Andreas Kotsakis
(Oxford Brookes University Law School), Melissa Scanlan (Vermont Law School),
Brad Mank (University of Cincinnati Law School), Julien Chaisse (Chinese University of Hong Kong), Bryan Mercurio (Chinese University of Hong Kong), Anatole Boute (Chinese University of Hong Kong), Yuhong Zhao (Chinese University of Hong Kong), Laurence Boisson de Chazournes (University of Geneva), David Zaring (University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School), Weitong Zheng (University of Florida, Levin College of Law), and Pamela Bookman (Temple University Beasley School of Law) for their questions and comments. The article is the
result of the joint research of the authors, as shown in Part 1 and 7. Paolo D.
Farah focused on Part 3, 4, and 5 and Riccardo Tremolada on Part 2 and 6. Corresponding Author e-mail address, Professor Paolo Davide Farah: paolofarah@yahoo.com
1. On the strategic relevance of shale gas in the United States, see Howard
Rogers, Shale gas—the Unfolding Story, 27 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 117
(2011); Steffen Jenner & Alberto J. Lamadrid, Shale Gas vs. Coal: Policy Implications from Environmental Impact Comparisons of Shale Gas, Conventional Gas, and Coal on Air, Water, and Land in the United States, 53
ENERGY POL’Y 442 (2013). An interesting comparative analysis between shale
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estimates a 49 percent growth in global marketed energy
consumption by 2035.2 Unconventional fossil fuel energy resources will grow approximately 4.9 percent per year up to 2035.3
Furthermore, shale formations are found in almost every region
of the globe; thus the potential for shale gas development is of
great importance.4
Although shale gas represents a revolutionary element in the
global energy framework, several regulatory and environmental concerns related to both its extraction and production processes have been raised, in particular about the use of hydraulic fracturing fluids and the consequential risk of drinking water contamination.5 As the “shale gas revolution” taking place
in the United States has highlighted, human health and environmental concerns continue to dog shale gas development.6 In
gas development in China and the United States was carried out by Joshua
Harvey and Yang Min in the framework of the Vermont Law School-China
Partnership for Environmental Law. In particular, see Joshua Harvey &
Yang Min, The Unconventional Promise and Problems of Shale Gas Development in the US and China: A Comparative Study, VLA-CHINA PARTNERSHIP
ENVT’L L., May 13, 2011, at 1.
2. That is, compared to a 2007 prerecession baseline. The EIA predicts
that unconventional fossil fuel energy resources will grow at approximately
4.9 percent per year until 2035. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., International Energy Outlook 2010, DOE/EIA-0484(2010), at 1–9
(July 2010),
http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2010/ph240/riley2/docs/EIA-0484-2010.pdf.
3. See, e.g., Stephen A. Holditch, The Increasing Role of Unconventional
Reservoirs in the Future of Oil and Gas Business, 55 J. PETROLEUM TECH. 34,
34 (Nov. 2003) (defining conventional reservoirs of oil and gas as “those that
can be produced at economic flow rates and that will produce economic volumes of oil and gas without large stimulation treatments or any special recovery process,” whereas Holditch defines unconventional reservoirs of oil
and gas as those “that cannot be produced at economic flowrates or that does
not produce economic volumes of oil and gas without assistance from massive
stimulation treatments or special recovery processes and technologies”).
4. Christophe McGlade et al., Unconventional Gas–A Review of Regional
and Global Resource Estimates 55 ENERGY 571, at 12–14 (2013).
5. Hydraulic fracturing implies the high-pressure injection of millions of
gallons of water-based hydraulic fracturing fluids to increase the permeability of the rock by holding the fractures open. Fracturing fluid is a mixture of
about 90 percent water, 9.5 percent sand, and 0.5 percent chemical additives.
See generally EPA, Hydraulic Fracturing Research Study, 2010. For a comprehensive overview of the legal rules governing the management of drinking
water, see generally Richard J. Lazarus, Crystals and Mud in Nature, 18
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 134 (2006).
6. Stephen G. Osborn et al., Methane Contamination of Drinking Water
Accompanying Gas-well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 PROC. NAT’L
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that respect, given the global scope of its potential, it is crucial
to ensure that the development of shale gas resources will be
carried out in an environmentally sound manner.7
China is aware of the importance of unconventional gas as a
carbon-friendly energy source and pivotal element in achieving
the country’s future energy and environmental objectives. As it
is the country with the largest increase in greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emissions, China’s capacity to substitute coal with
cheaper gas as its primary electricity-generating fuel has the
potential to represent a huge step toward global warming mitigation.8 However, China lacks comprehensive legal instruments capable of addressing the potential environmental hazards of shale gas extraction, and suffers from weak enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.9
This article begins with Part I examining the implications of
shale gas on the world’s energy market and its relevance regarding energy security, the recent vast increase in shale gas
production, and its potential for China’s energy mix and supply. In Part II, the article investigates the current Chinese regulatory framework, which lacks cohesive and satisfactory provisions regarding shale gas extraction. Specifically, Part II will
examine the institutional shortcomings that hinder effective
ACAD. SCI. 8172 (2011); David M. Kargbo et al., Natural Gas Plays in the
Marcellus Shale: Challenges and Potential Opportunities, 44 ENVTL./ SCI. &
TECH. 5679 (2010); Charles W. Schmidt, Blind Rush? Shale Gas Boom Proceeds Amid Human Health Questions 119 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A348 (2011);
Robert W. Howarth et al., Natural Gas: Should Fracking Stop?, 477 NATURE
271 (2011).
7. See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation 20
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 116 (2009); Eleanor Stephenson et al., Greenwashing Gas: Might a ‘Transition Fuel’ Label Legitimize Carbon-intensive
Natural Gas Development?, 46 ENERGY POL’Y 452 (2012).
8. See generally Choi Ieng Chu et al., The Current Status of Greenhouse
Gas Reporting by Chinese Companies: A Test of Legitimacy Theory, 28
MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. 114 (2013); Mingde Cao, Greenhouse Gas Emission
Reduction, 43 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 52 (2013); Zhu Liu et al., Uncovering China’s
Greenhouse Gas Emission from Regional and Sectorial Perspectives, 45
ENERGY 1059 (2012); Lorraine Sugar et al., Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
Chinese Cities, 16 J. INDUS. ECOLOGY 552 (2012); Hong Huo et al., Projection
of Energy Use and Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Motor vehicles in China:
Policy Options and Impacts, 43 ENERGY POL’Y 37 (2012).
9. See infra, Part II, for a discussion about the Chinese institutional and
regulatory framework.
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enforcement of environmental provisions, the pricing and fiscal
regime, and the current barriers to foreign investment access
to the Chinese energy market, which strongly counters China’s
need for technology and know-how. This analysis points out
that there are no Chinese laws that explicitly tackle the environmental risks of the fracking process. Part III discusses critical concerns about fresh water management vis-à-vis unconventional gas.10 These two natural resources have come to be
complexly linked because the extraction, treatment, and distribution of fresh water entail considerable energy, while the production of fossil fuel energy involves fresh water.
Part IV discusses the similarities between China and the
United States regarding shale gas. Shale gas is a pivotal element for the energy future of both countries, where energy security, energy efficiency, and environmental concerns are deeply intertwined. Their regulatory frameworks are not completely
dissimilar, as both have far-reaching federal or central laws
enforced by designated agencies. Furthermore, both countries
exhibit a gap between the formulation of federal/central law
and their enforcement at the local level. The similarities between the U.S. and Chinese energy systems allow for the drawing of parallels, which could be beneficial to the Chinese shale
gas industry. In that perspective, this article argues that the
current applicable Chinese legal framework is neither sufficient nor satisfactory, given what is at stake. In particular, it
questions how shale gas can represent a transitional fuel to renewable energy resources.
Part V discusses how shale gas radically impacts supply and
demand of the world’s energy mix and market, how new geopolitical factors must be assessed, how economic and demographic
growth will increase pressure on global energy supplies, and,
as a result, how all fuel sources will have to be exploited. This
article concludes that a comprehensive legal and regulatory
change is necessary in order to foster an environmentally
sound development of the shale gas sector in China. This
change would be conducive to the need to increase energy security, to achieve the country’s future energy and environmental

10. For a wider debate on the carbon footprint of unconventional gas, see
Robert H. Abrams & Noah D. Hall, Framing Water Policy in a Carbon Affected and Carbon Constrained Environment, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 3, 7 (2010).
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objectives, and to ensure beneficial economic growth and social
development.
I. THE REVOLUTIONARY ROLE OF SHALE GAS THROUGH THE
PRISM OF CHINA’S ENERGY MIX: THE GROWTH OF A NEW
INDUSTRY
The potential for shale gas development is currently being
explored in several countries.11 Shale gas is found in unconventional reservoirs, from which natural gas is extracted from the
low permeable source rock itself using a combination of techniques such as hydraulic fracturing12 and horizontal drilling,13
which create fissures in the rock allowing the gas to flow more
easily through it. In addition to shale gas resources, there are
other types of unconventional gas reservoirs: tight gas14 and
coal bed methane (“CBM”).15 That said, the present article focuses on shale gas due to recent enormous increase in shale gas

11. Shale gas development is currently being explored in several countries,
and shale gas reserves have been identified in some European countries and
in Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia,
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, India, Pakistan,
and China. 137 exploratory drilling operations are currently underway in
China and in parts of South America, particularly Argentina.
12. For a definition of “hydraulic fracturing,” see Hydraulic Fracturing
Research Study, supra note 5.
13. Horizontal drilling involves drilling a vertical well to the desired depth
and then drilling laterally to access a larger portion of the reservoir. George
E. King, Apache Corporation, Hydraulic Fracturing 101: What Every Representative, Environmentalist, Regulator, Reporter, Investor, University Researcher, Neighbor and Engineer Should Know about Estimating Frac Risk
and Improving Frac Performance in Unconventional Gas and Oil Wells (SPE
Hydraulic Fracturing Technology Conference, February 6-8, 2012).
14. Tight gas refers to natural gas that is trapped in sandstones. For the
significance of this energy source in China, see Dai Jinxini et al., Tight Gas in
China and Its Significance in Exploration and Exploitation, 39 PETROLEUM
EXPLORATION & DEV. 277 (2012).
15. CBM is a natural gas that is produced from coal seams, which act as
the source and reservoir for natural gas. Historically, China’s focus has been
on CBM, but recently its focus has shifted towards developing its shale gas
resources. Yumin Lv, Dazhen Tang, Hao Xu & Haohan Luo, Production
Characteristics and the Key Factors in High-Rank Coalbed Methane Fields: A
Case Study on the Fanzhuang Block, Southern Qinshui Basin, China, 96
INT’L J. COAL GEOLOGY 93 (2012). The term “unconventional gas” is used herein to indicate shale gas, which has been acknowledged as the most promising
unconventional gas.
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production and its potential for China’s energy mix and supply.16
Figure 1. Illustrative diagram of fracking and horizontal drilling operations.
A. A Transition Toward a More Sustainable Future?
Shale gas is widely referred to as a “bridge fuel,” implying its
capability to eventually replace hydrocarbons with carbon-free
renewable resources as a primary source of energy.17 This con16. China’s potential unconventional gas reservoirs are significant, although many still need to be more precisely estimated. The political support of
shale gas is also relevant, and the Chinese Ministry of Land and Resources
(“MLR”) announced “a strategic goal of reaching a production target of 15–30
BCM (billion cubic meters) by 2020.” See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, MEDIUM-TERM
OIL & GAS MARKETS 185 (2010). To achieve this goal, China must, inter alia,
acquire fracking technology and expertise. The state-owned company Sinopec
has already launched dialogue with international oil companies in furtherance of this goal. What is more, in November 2009, China and the United
States signed a Memorandum of Understanding (“MoU”) to jointly cooperate
in assessing China’s shale gas resources and foster investments in this sector.
See id. at 185, 188.
17. See Noam Lior, Sustainable Energy Development with Some GameChangers, 40 ENERGY 3, 4 (2012). See generally Hanna Mäkinen, Shale Gas–a
Game Changer in the Global Energy Play?, 1 BALTIC RIM ECON. 31 (2010);
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cept acknowledges that renewable resources cannot replace
hydrocarbons as a primary generating fuel in the near term,
and that, while shale gas remains a hydrocarbon, it has less
detrimental consequences on the environment than other fossil
fuels.18 In that respect, it appears that at the moment, renewable resources are less cost competitive than fossil fuels, in particular natural gas.19
Moreover, in addition to their high costs, renewable resources
present further downsides, including the need for installing
thousands of miles of new transmission lines requiring onerous
investments and burdensome regulatory approvals. With the
European Union and the United States examining ways to develop electricity projects that use renewable resources to generate electricity and to market the electricity produced by such
projects, it appears that they mainly rely on the continued
availability of federal and state subsidies and state-renewable
resource portfolio mandates.20 Given the ongoing global finanAmy Myers Jaffe, Shale Gas Will Rock the World, WALL ST. J. (May 10, 2010),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303491304575187880596301
668; PAUL STEVENS, THE ‘SHALE GAS REVOLUTION’: HYPE AND REALITY (2010);
Martin Wolf, Prepare for a Golden Age of Gas, REAL CLEAR MARKETS, Feb. 22,
2012,
http://www1.realclearmarkets.com/2012/02/22/prepare_for_a_golden_age_of_
natural_gas_123804.html.
18. See generally STEVENS, supra note 17.
19. It costs two to five times as much to generate electricity through the
use of renewable resources such as solar and wind as through use of gas. Furthermore, given that most renewables can generate electricity exclusively on
an intermittent basis, a unit of electricity generated through the use of a renewable resource is worth only about 25 percent as much as a unit of electricity generated through the use of gas. Paul L. Joskow, Comparing the Costs of
Intermittent and Dispatchable Electricity Generating Technologies, 100 AM.
ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 238 (2011); Paolo D. Farah & Elena Cima, Energy Trade and the WTO: Implications for Renewable Energy and the
OPEC Cartel, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 707 (2013).
20. Manuel Frondel et al., Economic Impacts from the Promotion of Renewable
Energy
Technologies:
The
German
Experience
(Ruhr Economic Papers, No. 156 (2009); Richard Schmalensee, Evaluating
Policies to Increase Electricity Generation from Renewable Energy, 6 REV.
ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 45 (2012); Mark A. Delucchi & Mark Z. Jacobson,
Providing All Global Energy with Wind, Water and Solar Power, Part I:
Technologies, Energy Resources, Quantities and Areas of Infastructure and
Materials, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 1170 (2011); Keith Williges et al., Making Concentrated Solar Power Competitive With Coal: The Costs of a European Feedin Tariff, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 3089 (2010); Paul Lehmann & Erik Gawel, Why
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cial recession, however, those subsidies and mandates are unlikely to be granted in the future. Rather, many EU countries
have already either reduced or eliminated those subsidies.21
On the other hand, the replacement of coal with natural gas,
including shale gas, as a generating fuel reduces emissions of
carbon dioxide. Hence, the expression “bridge fuel” reflects the
expectation of many policy makers that we can achieve mitigation of climate change in the near term by replacing coal with
natural gas, while eventually entirely replacing all hydrocarbons with carbon-free renewable resources in the long term.22
Clearly the practicality of this scenario is dependent on the
ability to take adequate measures to guarantee society that
hydraulic fracturing of shale basins can be carried out with low
environmental costs.
China is likely to benefit greatly from shale gas. The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that China will consume
more gas than the entire EU by 2035.23 As it is the country

Should Support Schemes for Renewable Electricity Complement the EU Emissions Trading Scheme?, 52 ENERGY POL’Y 597 (2013).
21. For instance, Portugal and Spain made the extraordinary decision of
reneging on the long-term commitments they made to renewable resource
projects by retroactively eliminating their subsidies. This way, the two Iberian countries saved many billions of Euros in the efforts to avoid defaulting on
their sovereign debt.
22. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas: A Long Bridge to a Promising Destination, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 245 (2012). See also Daniel P. Schrag, Is
Shale Gas Good for Climate Change?, DÆDALUS, J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI.,
Spring 2012, at 72. On the other hand, unconventional natural gas production is noted for its potential for significantly large quantities of methane
leakage, which is a potent GHG. During oil and gas production processes,
fugitive methane emissions are most commonly leaked or intentionally vented at the wellhead, and from pipes and valves. Merisha Enoe et al., Lessons
Learned: A Path Toward Responsible Development of China’s Shale Gas Resources, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, Aug. 2012, at 1, 6,
http://www.nrdc.cn/phpcms/userfiles/download/201208/16/Lessons%20Learne
d%20%20A%20Path%20Toward%20Responsible%20Development%20of%20China
%E2%80%99s%20Shale%20Gas%20Resources.pdf. For an argument that
dynamic governance innovation can facilitate climate-energy-water balancing
to address natural gas governance gaps, see Elizabeth Burleson, Climate
Change and Natural Gas Dynamic Governance, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 25
(2013).
23. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ARE WE ENTERING A GOLDEN AGE OF GAS?:
WORLD
ENERGY
OUTLOOK,
at
8
(2011),
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with the largest source of GHG emissions and the largest
source of increase in GHG emissions, China’s capacity to substitute coal with cheaper gas as its primary electricitygenerating fuel has the potential to represent a huge step toward global warming mitigation.24
However, relying on shale gas introduces the risk of neglecting investments in renewable energies. Some critics say that
the industry’s focus on developing shale gas and other unconventional sources is diverting attention and capital from the
development of renewables because low-cost power is generated
from copious natural gas supplies, which could frustrate the
economic viability of wind, solar, and geothermal projects, and
eventually delay the shift to renewable energies by many
years.25 Indeed, in the United States, shale gas as a source of
low-priced electric power created a more difficult competitive
environment for new wind projects.26 Similarly, the IEA suggests that the effect of falling gas prices due to increased shale
gas development could hamper the viability of low-carbon alternatives.27 Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that
it is not certain that gas prices will remain low if shale gas
must meet tighter regulatory criteria. Additionally, the ultimate price competitor in the power sector is not gas, but coal
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2011/weo2011_goldena
geofgasreport.pdf.
24. For a scientific perspective on the fact that a significant part of recent
global warming is driven by the accumulation of anthropogenically derived
greenhouse active gases in the Earth’s atmosphere, see John Dodsonn, Introduction, in CHANGING CLIMATES, EARTH SYSTEMS AND SOCIETY, at xix (John
Dodson ed., 2010).
25. In light of the great potential for investments in carbon markets, renewable energy sources, and low-carbon technologies, it is clear that international investment, renewables, and climate change are interdependent concepts. On this point, see generally Kate Miles, Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law Inaugural Conference, Issues in the Transition to a Low Carbon World (July 2,
2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1154588.
26. See generally DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY SECURITY AND THE
REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD (2011).
27. This was confirmed by the chief economist of the IEA, Fatih Birol, who
stated, “if gas prices come down, that would put a lot of pressure on governments to review their existing renewable energy support policies . . . . We
may see many renewable energy projects put on the shelf.” Fiona Harvey,
Natural Gas is No Climate Change ‘Panacea’, Warns IEA, GUARDIAN (June 6,
2011),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/jun/06/natural-gasclimate-change-no-panacea.
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(and, for base load capacity, nuclear, and hydropower). On this
point, Jenner and Lamadrid remark:
the crucial challenge in order to achieve grid parity is to meet
the coal price. This objective can be approached from two
sides: increased cost effectiveness of renewable energies and
storage solutions by further technological innovation; or internalization of the cost of carbon into the price of coal. Both
ways are relatively independent from the shale gas issue. 28

In other words, “shale gas holds the potential to smoothen the
transition to an age of renewable energies but we must be
aware of the potential of low gas prices to cause temporarily a
spike.”29
Extreme reliance on natural gas would equally frustrate the
efforts to maintain fuel mix diversity in the power sector, leaving ratepayers, utilities, and the economy as a whole vulnerable to the hazards of commodity price volatility. In that sense,
substitution of natural gas for other fossil fuels cannot be the
exclusive means to tackle GHG emissions and climate change,
given that natural gas is itself a fossil fuel. Further complementary actions are then needed in order to have a reasonable
chance of meeting climate goals.30 To this end, low-carbon investments, renewable energy deployment, carbon capture and
storage technologies, and energy efficient measures must be
prioritized in the international energy governance agenda. Another critical step in the right direction would be the establishment of a carbon tax that would allow negative externalities related to fossil fuels not to be priced by society.31 Finally,

28. S. Jenner & A.J. Lamadrid, supra note 1, at 449. On the internalization of the cost of carbon into the price of coal, see generally, David M. Driesen, Putting a Price on Carbon: The Metaphor, 44 ENVTL. L. 695 (2014); David
M. Driesen, The Limits of Pricing Carbon, 4 CLIMATE L. 107 (2014).
29. Id.
30. Instead of being thought of as competitors, however, natural gas and
renewable energy sources should be seen as complementary, not competitive,
components of the power sector. Natural gas plants can quickly scale up or
down their electricity production, and thus can act as an effective hedge
against the intermittency of renewables. CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY
SOLUTIONS, LEVERAGING NATURAL GAS TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS, at vii (2013), http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/leveraging-naturalgas-reduce-ghg-emissions.pdf.
31. William D. Nordhaus, To Tax or Not to Tax: Alternative Approaches to
Slowing Global Warming, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. POL’Y 26, 26 (2007); Liang
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further actions would require the development of a real-time
pricing mechanism for electricity32 and the reduction of direct
releases of methane into the atmosphere during the extraction
process. Emissions of methane are mainly caused by “flowback”
of the water forced into the rock formation during fracking, and
by leaks in processing and during transportation.33 Recent
studies suggest that these losses can be limited by the use of
the best technology, but cannot be completely avoided.34 In that
respect, it is crucial to measure precisely GHG emissions from
both natural gas production and consumption in order to minimize emissions along the entire natural gas chain.35 As technologies for producing shale gas continue to advance and the
industry grows in scale, wider collaboration on research and
development issues is required among governmental agencies
and international energy governance institutions.
In light of the aforesaid, a growing body of scientific research
questions how shale gas could ever be a transitional fuel that is
able to shift society from its current overreliance on fossil fuels
to a greater use of sustainable renewable energy, given its carbon intensity and the level of investment needed.36 FurtherQiao-Mei et al., Carbon Taxation Policy in China: How to Protect Energy-and
Trade-Intensive Sectors?, 29 J. POL’Y MODELING 311, 312 (2007).
32. Mark G. Lijesen, The Real-Time Price Elasticity of Electricity, 29
ENERGY ECON. 249 (2007); Stephen P. Holland & Erin T. Mansur, Is RealTime Pricing Green? The Environmental Impacts of Electricity Demand Variance, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 550, 550 (2008); Hunt Allcott, Rethinking Realtime Electricity Pricing, 33 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 820, 820 (2011).
33. CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, LEVERAGING NATURAL GAS TO
REDUCE
GREENHOUSE
GAS
EMISSIONS
22
(2013),
http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/leveraging-natural-gas-reduce-ghgemissions.pdf.
34. Recent scientific research indicates that relying on shale gas could in
fact be as harmful to the climate as reliance on coal. Robert W. Howarth et
al., Methane and the Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of Natural Gas from Shale
Formations, 106 CLIMATIC CHANGE 679, 686–87 (2011).
35. Indeed, natural gas is not carbon free. On the contrary, it releases
emissions by its combustion. Moreover it contains methane (CH4), a potent
GHG, whose release during production, transmission, and distribution may
offset the beneficial climate outcome of shale gas use.
36. On this point, Nobuo Tanaka, executive director of the IEA, stated,
“While natural gas is the cleanest fossil fuel, it is still a fossil fuel. Its increased use could muscle out low carbon fuels such as renewables . . . an expansion of gas use alone is no panacea for climate change.” See Harvey, supra
note 27. Indeed, according to studies carried out by the IEA, the development
of the shale gas industry would put our CO2 emissions on a “trajectory con-
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more, shale gas would most likely involve costly regulation.
Provided that natural and shale gas prices remain low, there
will be fewer inducements to invest in greener sources. Hence,
in order to satisfy their carbon-reduction targets, there is a risk
that governments could force the energy industry to make
these investments through regulation, which would greatly
augment costs across the entire oil and gas industry, and result
in repercussions on highly cost-sensitive shale gas investments,
projects, and operations.
B. China’s Stake in the Shale Gas Saga
Shale gas is already revolutionizing the world’s energy markets and industry. Vast deposits are being discovered throughout the world. China is aware of unconventional gas’s role as a
carbon-friendly energy source and pivotal element in achieving
the country’s future energy and environmental objectives: increasing energy security, decreasing GHG emissions,37 and
ameliorating domestic air quality while simultaneously empowering the country to pursue beneficial economic growth and
social development.38 A 2013 assessment of international shale
gas resources issued by the U.S. EIA39 estimated technically
sistent with a probable temperature rise of more than 3.5 degrees Celsius in
the long term.” INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (IEA), GOLDEN RULES FOR A GOLDEN
AGE OF GAS 91 (2012), http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/weo2009/. See generally David M. Driesen, Phasing Out Fossil Fuels, 38 NOVA L. REV. 523
(2013); Jody Freeman, A Critical Look at “The Moral Case for Fossil
Fuels”, 36 ENERGY L.J. 327 (2015).
37. According to the Kyoto Protocol’s emission-reduction obligations, the
Chinese government announced on November 25, 2009, that China’s unit
GDP CO2 emissions will decrease by 40 to 45 percent from 2005 to 2020.
Margret Kim & Robert Jones, China’s Energy Security and the Climate
Change Conundrum, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, 2005, at 3, 6; Deng Haifeng,
Legal Interactive Mechanism on Climate Change: A Comparative Study of
China and U.S. Experiences, 8 US-CHINA L. REV. 431, 431–44 (2011); Paul
Howard, Harmony in China’s Climate Change Policy, in CLIMATE CHANGE
AND GROWTH IN ASIA 177 (M. Hossain & E. Selvanathan eds., 2011).
38. For a prediction of Chinese energy consumption and carbon dioxide
emissions in a scenario of the all-inclusive well-off society in 2020, see Wei Lu
& Yitai Ma, Image of Energy Consumption of Well Off Society in China, 45
ENERGY CONVERSION & MGMT. 1357 (2004). On the relationship between economic growth and social development, see, for example, Gheorhe H. Popescu,
The Social Evolution of China’s Economic Growth, 1 CONTEMP. READINGS L. &
SOC. JUST. 88, 90 (2013).
39. The EIA is an independent arm of the U.S. DOE.
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recoverable shale gas resources in China at 1115 trillion cubic
feet,40 nearly 50 percent more than resources in the United
States.41 In reality, China’s national oil companies have already commenced shale gas exploratory drilling with the technical
and
financial
assistance
of
joint
ventures
with multinational companies such as Total, BP, and Royal
Dutch Shell.42 The rigid structure of China’s state-controlled oil
and gas industry hampers efforts to exploit reserves, because
the current absence of competition between the three stateowned energy giants (China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC), Sinopec, and PetroChina) is not conducive to a fair allocation of resources. In that sense, the country’s current energy regulation is characterized by overregulation of the energy
market, a fragmented system of regulation, and insufficient
environmental regulation.43 Moreover, numerous Chinese investments in North American shale basins illustrates Beijing’s
concrete commitment to exploring the potential of shale gas
resources, as China is exponentially building its shale gas capacity in order to achieve energy security and influence in the
world’s gas-pricing regimes.44 What emerges is a growing Chi40. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., TECHNICALLY RECOVERABLE SHALE OIL AND
SHALE GAS RESOURCES: AN ASSESSMENT OF 137 SHALE FORMATIONS IN 41
COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES 6 (2013). See also Li Shizhen, The
Status of World Shale Gas Exploration and Development and Implications for
China, 6 GEOLOGICAL BULL. 918 (2010).
41. China has an estimated 1115 Tcf of risked, technically recoverable
shale gas, located mainly in marine- and lacustrine-deposited source rock
shales of the Sichuan (626 Tcf), Tarim (216 Tcf), Junggar (36 Tcf), and
Songliao (16 Tcf) basins. Additionally, technically recoverable shale gas resources totaling 222 Tcf exist in the smaller, structurally more complex,
Yangtze Platform, Jianghan, and Subei basins. Shale gas leasing and exploration drilling are already underway in China, primarily in the Sichuan Basin and Yangtze Platform areas and are led by PetroChina, Sinopec, and
Shell. The government has set an ambitious but probably unachievable target
for shale gas production of 5.8 to 9.7 Bcfd by 2020. See McGlade et al., supra
note 4.
42. Id.
43. Xin Qiu & Honglin Li, Energy Regulation and Legislation in China 42
ENVTL. L. REP. 10678 (2012).
44. Globally, States engage in multilateral or bilateral inter-State relations to pursue energy security, while building up extensive reserves that
inevitably impact on the world’s oil and gas supply. Paolo Davide Farah &
Piercarlo Rossi, National Energy Policies and Energy Security in the Context
of Climate Change and Global Environmental Risks: A Theoretical Framework for Reconciling Domestic and International Law through a Multiscalar
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nese engagement in international relations in order to guarantee a steady energy supply for its ever-increasing domestic
needs.45 At the moment, natural gas demand continues to exceed supply, making China a net importer; but, at the same
time, domestic production has been burgeoning,46 increasing
the share of natural gas in total energy requirements from 2
percent to 4 percent, and expected to reach 8 percent by 2015
and 10 percent by 2020.47
However, after assessing the development of the shale gas
industry in China, one can see that the current applicable legal
framework is neither sufficient nor satisfactory given what is
at stake. China must still adequately delineate a policy framework regarding pricing mechanisms, energy regulation, and
physical infrastructures, as well as management of environmental risks that may be connected to the development of its
unconventional gas resources. The exploitation of natural reserves is a strategic sector for national security and, in that
sense, is highly sensitive to political influences and extremely
prone to State intervention. The central government firmly
controls shale gas blocks by granting exploration rights and
and Multilevel Approach, 20 EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 232, 232–34
(2011); Rafael Leal-Arcas & Andrew Filis, The Fragmented Governance of the
Global Energy Economy: a Legal-Institutional Analysis 6 J. WORLD ENERGY L.
& BUS. 1, 4 (2013).
45. Andreas Goldthau, Energy Diplomacy in Trade and Investment in Oil
and Gas, in GLOBAL ENERGY GOVERNANCE: THE NEW RULES OF THE GAME 25,
25 (2010).
46. China augmented natural gas domestic production from 27.2 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2001 (approximately 106 percent of domestic consumption) to 94.5 bcm in 2010 (approximately 89 percent of domestic consumption).
Given the continuously increasing domestic need, China is also implementing its energy infrastructure network. In that respect, the 4200-km
West-to-East pipeline was built to transport gas from Xinjiang Province in the
west to Shanghai, and the TransAsian pipeline was opened in 2009 to bring gas
from Turkmenistan to China. Moreover, four liquefied natural gas (“LNG”)
receiving terminals were brought online, allowing LNG to meet some 10 percent of Chinese gas demand. A few more LNG receiving terminals are under
construction. See McGlade et al., supra note 4; Ruud Weijermars & Crispian
McCredie, Assessing Shale Gas Potential, PETROLEUM REV., Oct. 2011, at 1.
47. Boqiang Lin & Ting Wang, Forecasting Natural Gas Supply in China:
Production Peak and Import Trends, 49 ENERGY POL’Y 225, (2012); Guy CK
Leung, China’s Energy Security: Perception and Reality, 39 ENERGY
POL’Y 1330 (2011); OIL AND GAS RESOURCES IN CHINA: A ROADMAP TO 2050
(Guangding Liu et al. eds., 2011); Junchen Li et al., Forecasting the Growth of
China’s Natural Gas Consumption, 36 ENERGY 1380 (2011).
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organizing auctions. The first round of tendering for shale gas
exploration rights in June 2011 was held in the form of an invitation tender, and only State- and province-controlled oil and
gas enterprises were able to bid on the gas drilling projects,
namely, China National Off-shore Oil Corporation (CNOOC),
Sinopec, PetroChina, Yanchang Petroleum, China United
Coalbed Methane Corporation, and Henan CBM.48 The exclusion of foreign companies from being eligible to obtain production licenses was possibly aimed at retaining control over the
scope of investments and the production ratio. The second
round of tendering was held in October 2012, which opened
bidding to state-owned enterprises in other industries as well
as privately-held Chinese investment entities (Sinochem and
Zhenhua Oil) in order to foster greater competition and innovativeness in the infant shale gas industry.49 However, the Chinese government still has enormous leeway in deciding which
enterprises can access its shale gas industry, and the entry of
non-state Chinese companies will not change this situation given that these entities continue to rely on cooperation with
State-controlled PetroChina, which owns and runs the national
transmission network.50 Nevertheless, foreign companies are
neither able to bid nor act independently for either extraction
or infrastructure projects, as they are merely allowed to operate under approved joint ventures with Chinese firms. Domestic companies apply for permits to explore and develop sites,
after which they can enter into partnerships with foreign investors.51
State-owned enterprises such as CNPC and CNOOC can acquire specific technical skills by investing in North American
shale gas companies and establishing joint ventures. For in48. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., China – International Energy Data and
Analysis
(May
14,
2015),
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Chin
a/china.pdf.
49. Cameron McKenna, Shale Gas: Legal Developments in Some Key Jurisdictions
Across
the
Globe,
LEXOLOGY
(Dec.
5,
2011),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0e5143b6-f9d2-45b0-bbebbd8805b6a572.
50. Christina Larson, China’s Shale-Gas Potential and Peril, BLOOMBERG
BUS. WEEK, (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-0418/chinas-shale-gas-potential-and-peril.
51. KPMG GLOB. ENERGY INST., SHALE GAS: GLOBAL M&A TRENDS 11
(2012).
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stance, Shell and CNPC have partnered in digging more than
thirty gas wells in Middle Sichuan Province, and discovered
shale gas in Fushun-Yongchuan Block, which is considered the
first commercial shale gas project in China.52 The two companies signed the first production-sharing agreement approved
for foreign involvement in the shale gas sector.53 Usually foreign oil and gas companies seek to join product sharing agreements (“PSAs”), which represent the classic form of contracting
of oil and gas resources. Similarly, Statoil, ConocoPhillips, BP,
Chevron, and Exxon Mobil have entered into joint study
agreements with Chinese national oil companies and they are
likely to transform their agreements into PSAs later on.54
In a PSA, an international oil company is more of a partner
in the venture, and shares both the resulting oil and control of
the operation either directly or through a joint-operation body.
PSAs can be beneficial to governments of countries that lack
the expertise and capital to exploit their natural resources and
wish to attract foreign companies to do so. An international oil
company usually shares the resulting profits and oil/gas, but is
obligated to pay not only royalties but also income tax on its
share. An alternative method to approaching the market is to
acquire or enter into a cooperation agreement with a local oil or
gas field service provider.
The principal technique to foster production and use of unconventional natural gas is through government-set goals and
mandates, which State-run entities, with some participation
from private companies, pursue with projects and adequate investments. The vast participation in the aforementioned tenders reflects the market enthusiasm concerning the potential of
the shale gas industry. However, lack of experience will carry
relevant hindrances on shale gas exploitation in China. Lack of
52. Unconventional Oil & Gas Resources, CHINESE NAT’L PETROL. CORP.,
http://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/umconventional/common_index.shtml (last visited
Mar. 6, 2016).
53. Shell committed to contributing at least $1 billion each year for the
joint venture to fund exploration. Shell Plans to Spend $1 Billion a Year on
China
Gas,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS,
(Mar.
28,
2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-26/shell-plans-to-spend-1billion-on-china-shale-gas-development.
54. Edwin Lee, Shale Gas in China: How Far From Dream to Reality?,
LEXOLOGY
(June
3,
2013),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4744bcac-ffd4-4db5-ac27d3e72358e28c.
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technology, equipment, a competitive market, and transportation networks, coupled with blind investment and over exploitation, are the common challenges to economic development in
China. Furthermore, a great number of enterprises entering
the market at once might cause excessive production capacity,
industrial structure imbalance, and uncontrolled environmental pollution. Additionally, the concerns related to land availability, lack of supply chains, and foundation facilities will bring
more challenges to shale gas exploitation in China.
It remains to be seen what the implications will be in terms
of environmental costs. Shale gas is obtained through hydraulic
fracturing, a controversial extracting technology which creates,
as highlighted by the shale gas boom that took place in the
United States,55 critical environmental threats, namely contamination of freshwater aquifers by fracturing fluids and depletion of local water supplies. In China, these obstacles to the
mature development of the country’s unconventional gas reserves are augmented by two deeply intertwined hurdles: the
absence of a comprehensive legal framework specifically addressing the potential environmental hazards of shale gas production, and weak enforcement of relevant laws and regulations. Acknowledging the importance of shale gas as a bridging
source of energy in the shift from fossil fuels to clean energy,
the primary need is to minimize environmental damages related to the process of shale gas extraction and achieve the goal of
extracting shale gas in an environmentally responsible way,
which is mainly a matter of regulation and enforcement. In the
last decade, the United States has taken the lead in exploration, development, technology, production, and export of shale
gas. Consequentially the U.S. experience could be helpful for
other countries, such as China, which wish to develop their
own shale gas industries.

55. Pulitzer Prize-winning energy author Daniel Yergin remarks how
quickly natural gas from shale formations joined the energy mix in the United States: “Shale gas really has been a revolution that’s happened extremely
rapidly . . . . It’s gone from being virtually none of our natural gas production
to about 30 percent of our total natural gas production.” YERGIN, supra note
26. See also Wiseman, supra note 7; Angela C. Cupas, The Not-So-Safe Drinking Water Act: Why We Must Regulate Hydraulic Fracturing at the Federal
Level, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 605, 609–11 (2009).
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II. CHINESE INSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The current Chinese regulatory framework lacks cohesive
and satisfactory provisions regarding shale gas extraction and
its related environmental concerns. There appears to be a generalized absence of cohesiveness in the energy-resources system, which is characterized by institutional fragmentation and
conflicts of interest among a plethora of entities. The Chinese
legal system features a tripartite structure: the National People’s Committee passes laws; the State Council passes regulations; various ministries create rules; and departments within
the ministries create other legislative documents. In the context of shale gas production, the Ministry of Environmental
Protection (MEP) plays a fundamental role as it is responsible
for enforcing environmental laws through its provincial and
municipal subsidiaries. Another fundamental body is the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which
oversees the National Energy Administration and sets broad
environmental standards and long-term goals that are regulated and enforced through provincial and municipal-level
branches of the MEP.56
A. Regulation of the Shale Gas Industry in China
Regulation of the shale gas industry is horizontally fragmented and jointly undertaken by at least six authorities at the
ministerial level, including the NDRC, Ministry of Land Resources (MLR), Ministry of Finance (MOF), MEP, Ministry of
Science and Technology (MOST), and the State Administration
of Taxation (SAT). The presence of many regulators carries the
risk of conflict and makes the allocation of competences unclear. What emerges from an initial analysis is that the NDRC
is in charge of shale gas industrial policies and planning, which
covers targets, transportation, consumption, and pricing.57
MLR is responsible for public tenders of shale gas blocks and
the setting of thresholds for entry.58 MOF and SAT jointly determine tax incentives, such as grants and preferential fiscal
policies.59 MOST works on improving and developing technolo56. ALBERT CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (3d ed. 2004).
57. Lee, supra note 54.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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gies for the Chinese geological environment, while MEP has
strategic relevance as a supervisor and sets minimum standards for underground and surface water protection, wastewater
treatment and recycling, air pollution, and protection of species
of animals and plants.60
There are currently no Chinese laws that explicitly tackle the
environmental risks of the fracking process. Moreover, although shale gas development is part of China’s current FiveYear Strategic Plan, the Chinese government has neither
passed legislation nor provided any guidance for shale gas exploration, market application, and strategic planning.61 Despite
this, several existing laws, if broadly interpreted, might be applied. However, these existing laws are neither exclusively concerned nor purposely drafted to deal with shale gas. In particular, the most pertinent law regarding shale gas production and
its potential environmental perils is the Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law (WPPCL),62 which sets central and
local water standards to which local governments must adapt
their regulations within a “cooperative federalism” framework.63 This legal tool provides a number of measures aimed at
protecting drinking water64 and forbidding the construction of
drainage outlets in specific areas. Article 38 of the Water Law
lays down that “protective measures shall be taken . . . while
constructing underground engineering facilities or carrying out
underground prospecting, mining, and other underground ac-

60. Id.
61. For text in English of the Energy and Climate Goals of China’s 12th
Five-Year Plan, see Joanna Lewis, Pew Ctr. on Glob. Climate Change, Energy
and Climate Goals of China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (Mar. 2011),
http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/energy-climate-goals-china-twelfth-five-yearplan.pdf.
62. Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 11, 1984, amended Feb. 28, 2008).
Another law that could come into play in this context is the Water and Soil
Conservation Law. On this point see, Nengye Liu, People’s Republic of China:
Water and Soil Conservation Law, 1 IUCN ACAD. ENVTL. L. E-JOURNAL 69
(2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2040619.
63. Elizabeth Burleson, Cooperative Federalism and Hydraulic Fracturing:
A Human Right to a Clean Environment, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 289
(2013);
see
also,
Jody Freeman,
Network
Federalism
(2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2356380.
64. Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, supra note 62, art.
56.
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tivities.”65 The expression “other underground activities” certainly includes the fracturing process. Furthermore, the Water
Law prohibits the discharge of a number of chemicals usually
used in American fracturing fluids,66 while allowed pollutant
discharges are capped at fixed amounts.67
Although the WPPCL constitutes a fundamental tool in relation to the issues analyzed in this article, its coverage is still
limited. While it requires that the State establish and improve
compensation mechanisms for ecological protection of the water
environment in drinking water source areas and reservoirs by
instruments such as payment of transfers, no supporting laws
and regulations currently exist.68 Furthermore, the WPPCL
contains some ambiguous provisions and lacks any definition of
the authority of the local governments, creating a vacuum that
frustrates the effectiveness of the regulatory framework.69 The
WPPCL permits the governments of provinces, autonomous
regions, and municipalities to establish their own standards for
items not set by a central body, and includes strong punitive
measures to be imposed upon violators who can be fined and
ordered to remediate the damage they have caused.70 In particular, in the amended WPPCL promulgated in February 2008
and effective on June 1, 2008, stricter penalties against violators were added to enhance law enforcement.71 Nevertheless,
without detailed guidelines for implementing the law, effective
enforcement of those stricter penalties remains unfulfilled.

65. Id. art. 38.
66. Such chemicals include “any oil, acid, or alkaline solutions or highly
toxic liquid waste” or “any highly toxic soluble waste residue containing mercury, cadmium, arsenic, chromium, lead, cyanide, etc.” Id. arts. 29, 31.
67. Id. art. 18.
68. RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CHINESE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 72 (Tianbao
Qin ed., 2015).
69. On the authority of local governments on environmental issues in China, see Alex Wang, The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental
Law and Bureaucracy in China, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L.R. 365, 429 (2013).
70. Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, supra note 62, art.
13.
71. Jingyun Li & Jingjing Liu, Quest for Clean Water: China’s Newly
Amended Water Pollution Control Law, WILSON CTR. (July 7, 2009),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/quest-for-clean-water-chinas-newlyamended-water-pollution-control-law#sthash.vaquLxby.dpuf.
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Other relevant legal instruments are the Mineral Resources
Law72 and the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on
Sino-foreign Cooperation in the Exploitation of Continental Petroleum Resources.73 The former outlines a unified regional
registration regime for the exploration of mineral resources,
and is thus applicable to shale gas exploitation.74 To obtain
permission for exploration and extraction of minerals, a production plan must be submitted for approval by the Department of Geology and Mineral Resources. However, the qualifying criteria for approval are quite vague, and the law does not
specifically define them.75 On the other hand, the Regulations
of the People’s Republic of China on Sino-foreign Cooperation
in the Exploitation of Continental Petroleum Resources targets
the types of partnerships currently spreading in the exploration and production of unconventional gas.76 The problem ap72. P.R.C. Law on Mineral Resources (promulgated by Order No. 36 of the
President of the People’s Republic of China, Mar. 19, 1986, effective Aug. 29,
1996).
73. Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Exploitation of
On-shore Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises
(promulgated by Decree No. 317 of the State Council of the People’s Republic
of China, Sept. 23, 2001, effective Sept. 23, 2001).
74. P.R.C. Law on Mineral Resources, supra note 72, art. 16.
75. The qualifying criteria for approval require adherence to: “qualifications prescribed by the State, and the department in charge of examination
and approval shall, in accordance with law and relevant State regulations
examine the enterprise’s mining area, its mining design or mining plan, production and technological conditions and safety and environmental protection
measures.” Id. art. 15.
76. In particular, Article 13 states:
To cooperate in the exploitation of on-shore resources, the Chinese
petroleum companies and the foreign enterprise must enter into a
contract. Unless laws, regulations or the contract specifies otherwise,
the foreign enterprise entering into the contract (hereinafter referred
to as the “foreign contractor”) solely shall provide the investment for
the exploration, be responsible for the exploration operations and
bear all exploration risks. After the discovery of an oil (gas) field
with commercial exploitation value, the foreign contractor and the
Chinese petroleum companies shall jointly invest in cooperative development. The foreign contractor shall undertake the development
and production operations, until production operations are taken
over by Chinese petroleum companies as stipulated in the contract.
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Exploitation of On-shore
Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises, art. 13. Lianyong Feng et al., Developmental Features of the Chinese Petroleum Industry
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pears to be that there are potentially applicable domestic and
regional laws but inadequate mechanisms for their implementation.
As for environmental law, despite the efforts made by China
to craft a comprehensive environmental legal framework over
the past thirty years, in practice, implementation has been notoriously poor.77 Nevertheless, during China’s 11th Five-Year
Plan period (2006–10), bureaucrats started taking innovative
action on environmental protection and energy efficiency, setting high priority, quantitative pollution reduction and energy
efficiency performance targets that were assigned to governors,
mayors, county magistrates, and State-owned enterprise leaders in every corner of China’s massive bureaucracy. This new
perspective derived from the prioritization of environmental
protection through the “cadre evaluation system,” i.e., China’s
system for top-down bureaucratic personnel evaluation.78 As
Alex L. Wang remarked, this evaluation framework is part of a
far-reaching political strategy to limit risks to the party-state’s
hold on power.79 In this vein, the cadre evaluation system fostered the use of environmental protection as an instrument for
promoting the essential elements of China’s “performance legitimacy,” namely, sustained economic growth and social stability.80 This shows how decentered the role of law in Chinese
governance still is, and stresses the primary role of hierarchical
structures and bureaucratic-plan targets.81 Consequentially,
in Recent Years, in THE CHINESE OIL INDUSTRY: HISTORY AND FUTURE 17, 36–
37 (Springer, 2013).
77. A leading Chinese environmental law scholar stated: “China’s green
laws are useless.” Jin Wang, China’s Green Laws are Useless, CHINA
DIALOGUE
(Sept.
23,
2010),
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/3831.
78. Wang, supra note 69, at 368, n. 13 (“‘Cadres,’ simply put, are partystate bureaucrats, which in the Chinese system include bureaucrats in State
agencies and bureaus, state-owned enterprise workers, and staff in a range of
other state institutions.”).
79. Id. at 370.
80. Id.
81. Wang remarks,
Bureaucratic mandates sit at the core of China’s governance apparatus, leading the way. Despite years of official rhetoric on the development of Chinese rule of law, laws and regulations remain secondary. And their implementation is heavily influenced by whether
they support or conflict with senior bureaucratic mandates. As a
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Chinese leaders have relied mainly on top-down party-state
bureaucratic mandates to drive performance of new environmental goals. At the same time, the cadre evaluation system
represents an effort to promote (although haltingly) environmental values as a new source of legitimacy in line with the
Hu-Wen rubric of a “harmonious society” as a programmatic
response to concerns about declining State legitimacy.82
practical matter, to understand Chinese governance we must understand this relationship between targets and law.
Id. at 372; see also Carl Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP.
L. 935, 949 (2011).
82. In the early 2000s, China’s leadership spurred an internal debate on
how to strengthen the legitimacy of China’s regime. The debate mirrored concerns about the limits of regime legitimacy mainly relying on economic performance, and highlighted the need for “an ongoing shift from growthcentered performance to a post-growth mode of legitimation that incorporated
social equality, justice, and welfare.” Bruce Gilley & Heike Holbig, The Debate on Party Legitimacy in China: a Mixed Quantitative/Qualitative Analysis, 18 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 339, 339, 357 (2009). On February, 19, 2005, Chinese President Hu Jintao stressed the importance of developing the capacity
to create a “harmonious society,” i.e. a society based on democracy and rule of
law, fairness and justice, honesty and friendliness, full of vigor, and a harmonious relationship between humans and nature. See Hu Jintao, Building a
Harmonious Society Important Task for CPC, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Feb.
21, 2005), http://en.people.cn/200502/20/eng20050220_174036.html; Paolo D.
Farah, EU and US Perspectives about China’s Compliance with Transparency
Commitments and the Transitional Review Mechanism, 33 LEGAL ISSUES
ECON. INTEGRATION, 263, 275 (2006). On the broader implications on global
justice of environmental issues, see generally BENJAMIN K. SOVACOOL,
MICHAEL H. DWORKIN, GLOBAL ENERGY JUSTICE (2014). Furthermore, the report to the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China stresses
the importance of ecological civilization as a key element for the well-being of
the Chinese people and the future of the country. The report also develops the
concept of “Beautiful China,” introducing a notion of development that emphasizes the strategic relevance of environmental protection even when this
could be in conflict with energy security and economic development. Bruce
Gilley and Heike Holbig argue that the Hu-Wen harmonious society represented a “programmatic solution to China’s ‘performance dilemma’ and an
innovative model of political legitimation.” Id. On this point, see Resolution
on Strengthening the Construction of the Party’s Governing Capacity, approved by the 4th plenary session of the 16th CCP Central Committee (September
16–19,
2004),
available
in
Chinese
at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1026/2809350.html. The performance
dilemma is the risk that autocratic rulers face undermining their own power
if reforms that generate good economic performance lead to demands for
greater political participation and democracy.
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On more general terms, it can be said that there are two generations of Chinese “environmental” laws: the first focused on
economic development, and the second on environmental protection. This parallels the general shift in U.S. legislation from
pre-1960s laws to the new laws enacted from the 1960s through
the 1980s.83 The traditional Chinese environmental laws84 focused on the development and use of natural resources by humans rather than the relationship between humans and nature,85 whose ethical basis is to be found in the deep-rooted
83. Christopher L. Bell et al., Government Institutes, in ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW HANDBOOK (Thomas F. P. Sullivan ed., 21st ed. 2011); Brittany Dunton,
Recent Developments in Environmental Law, 26 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 147, 166,
175 (2012); Lisa Heinzerling, New Directions in Environmental Law: A Climate of Possibility, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 263, 266–68 (2011); Linda K.
Breggin et al., Trends in Environmental Law Scholarship 2008-2012, 43
ENVTL. L. REV. 10643 (2012); Amy J. Wildermuth, Next Step: The Integration
of Energy Law and Environmental Law, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 369, 380
(2011); Donald N. Zillman, Evolution of Modern Energy Law: a Personal Retrospective, 30 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 485, 489–94 (2012); J. B. Ruhl,
Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 343 (2010); VED P. NANDA & GEORGE ROCK
PRING, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY (2d revised ed. 2012); R. Daniel Kelemen & David Vogel, Trading
Places: The Role of the United States and the European Union in International Environmental Politics, 43 COMP. POL. STUD. 427 (2010).
84. These laws include the Prevention and Control Atmospheric Pollution
Act, the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution Act, the Prevention and
Control of Solid Wastes Act, the Prevention and Control of Prevention from
Environmental Noise Act, and the Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pollution Act. P.R.C. Law on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution (promulgated by the President of the People’s Republic of China, Apr. 29,
2000, effective Sept. 1, 2000) art. 1.; see P.R.C. Law on the Prevention and
Control of Water Pollution, supra note 62; P.R.C. Law on the Prevention and
Control of Envtl. Pollution by Solid Wastes (promulgated by Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005) art. 1.; P.R.C. Law
on the Prevention and Control of Pollution From Envtl. Noise (promulgated
by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 29, 1996, effective Mar. 1,
1997) art. 1.; P.R.C. Law on Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pollution
(promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Jun. 28, 2003, effective Oct. 1, 2003) art. 1. See also Mingde Cao, Fundamental Principles of Ecological Law, 39 2002 U. WUHAN INT’L L. REV. 39 (2002).
85. Mingde points out that China’s environmental and energy law and
policy before 2000 was built upon the ethical basis of a narrow anthropocentrism, whose concept for legislation and tenet embodied the natural concept
of utilitarianism. Mingde Cao, The Current and Future Trends in Chinese
Environmental and Energy Law and Policy, 18 PACE INT’L L. REV. 253, 258
(2006).
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concept of “harmonious nature.”86 These laws do not emphasize
the prevention of environmental pollution but instead focus on
remediation and passive reactions, and eventually risk disharmony and friction in the relationship between humans and
nature. Conversely, the newest generation of Chinese environmental laws emphasizes the purpose of achieving harmony
with nature and its conservation, rather than stressing economic growth. That said, recent Chinese environmental laws
are substantially different from earlier legal instruments, as
they foster the recycling economy and regulate clean processes
of production,87 focusing on minimizing pollution from the beginning through the end of the production process.
In the context of shale gas environmental hazards, two legal
instruments come into play: the 2003 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion of Clean Production,88 and
the 2002 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Environ86. Mingde Cao remarks that the concept of “harmonious nature” has a
deep cultural root in China’s traditional culture, and should be inherited and
applied to today’s environmental challenges. In that respect, Confucianism
developed the principles that “nature and human beings understand each
other,” and of “nature and human beings combined into one.” Regarding the
relationship between humans and nature, Taoism preached noninterference
and adaptation with the course of natural events. In the same vein, Buddhism advocated the right of natural life forms other than humans to exist.
Mingde Cao & Yi-xiang Xu, The Formulation of Chinese Civil Code and the
Protection of Ecology, 4 XIAN DAI FAXUE [Mod. L. Sci.] 13 (2003); see also Paolo D. Farah, L’influenza della concezione confuciana sulla costruzione del
sistema giuridico e politico cinese [The Influence of Confucianism in the Construction of the Chinese Juridical and Political System], in IDENTITÀ EUROPEA
E POLITICHE MIGRATORIE 193–226 (Giovanni Bombelli & Bruno Montanari
eds., 2008); Jean-Yves Heurtebise, Understanding Non-Trade Concerns
Through Comparative Chinese and European Philosophy of Law, in CHINA’S
INFLUENCE ON NON-TRADE CONCERNS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Paolo
Davide Farah ed., forthcoming 2016).
87. “Clean production” is understood as a new industrial mode featuring
technical plausibility, economic rationality and eco-efficiency, which is at the
core of realizing a hazardless industry, i.e., production is organized in accordance with ecological principles, and raw materials are recycled in a closed
cycle.
88. Law on the Promotion of Clean Production (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. June 29, 2002, effective January 1, 2003),
2003 - Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China No. 72, as
revised pursuant to the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress on Revising the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Promotion of Cleaner Production” promulgated on February 29, 2012 - Order
of the President of the People’s Republic of China No. 54.
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ment Impact Assessment.89 The former specifically addresses
pollution from oil and gas production, requiring that operators
and subcontractors involved in petroleum production “protect
fishery resources and other natural resources and prevent the
environment, including the air, sea, rivers, lakes and land,
from being polluted or damaged” through respect of international standards and best practices.90 On the other hand, the
2002 Law on Environment Impact Assessment fosters a predictive evaluation policy on the environmental impact that may
occur due to the implementation of building projects and planning. This regime is thus consistent with the purposes of sustainable development91 and the principle of environmental law
of “pollution prevention first.”92

89. Jesse L. Moorman & Zhang Ge, Promoting and Strengthening Public
Participation in China’s Environmental Impact Assessment Process: Comparing China’s EIA Law and U.S. NEPA, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 281, 282 (2007).
Adopted in October 2002, the EIA became effective on September 1, 2003.
90. An indicative case study on enforcement is the benzene chemical spill
of 2005 in the Junhgua River. Weili Duan et al., The Situation of Hazardous
Chemical Accidents in China Between 2000 and 2006, 186 J. HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS 1489 (2011). Jane Qiu, China to Spend Billions Cleaning up
Groundwater SCIENCE 745, 745 (2011). Xiao Yong Wang et al., Water Pollution Emergencies in China: Actualities, Prevention and Response, 159
ADVANCED MATERIALS RES. 589 (2011).
91. This concept of “sustainable development” stems from the concept that
individuals should respect and care for the community of life, recognize that
all beings are interdependent, and that every form of life has value regardless
of its worth to human beings. See Nicholas A. Robinson, Enforcing Environmental Norms: Diplomatic and Judicial Approaches, 26 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 387, 387–89 (2003). As Chapin Folke, and Kofinas remarked,
“social–ecological sustainability requires that society’s economy and other
human activities not exceed the capacity of ecosystems to provide services,
which, in turn, is constrained by the planet’s life-support system.” F. Stuart
Chapin, III, et al., A Framework for Understanding Change, in PRINCIPLES OF
ECOSYSTEM
STEWARDSHIP:
RESILIENCE-BASED
NATURAL
RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT IN A CHANGING WORLD 6 (F. Stuart Chapin, III, et al. eds, 2009).
See also Doug M. Brown, Market and Exchange in Premodern Economies, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 84–88 (Philip A. O’Hara ed., 2001).
92. On this principle, see James E. Hickey Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining
the Precautionary Principle in International Environmental Law, 14 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 423 (1994); Nicolas De Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: from
Political Slogans to Legal Rules (2002); David M. Driesen, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Precautionary Principle: Can They Be Reconciled, 2013 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 771 (2013).
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B. Potential Regulations, Policies, and Protections for Hydraulic Fracturing
As a result, it would be advisable for jurisdictions in which
hydraulic fracturing techniques are employed to first have gas
companies conduct a thorough environmental impact assessment.93 The shale gas drilling process can lead to land subsidence and earth vibrations, carrying with it civil liability for the
oil operators who need to implement protective measures with
a view to damage prevention.94 If damage to protected interests—such as property, life, or the environment—occurs, compensation takes the form of restoration of the conditions as
they existed before the damage occurred. In this regard, the
liability regime established by the Chinese Civil Code, mining,
and environmental legislation is applicable to any damage resulting from shale gas exploration and production activities.
Moreover, Chinese lawmakers should also adopt and effectively
enact legislation requiring water sampling near proposed well
sites and a minimum liability insurance coverage for bodily injury and property damage caused by well operations.95 Regarding the crucial value of assessment, Hannah Wiseman maintains that the assessment process is necessarily multifactorial
and contingent, consequentially determining whether optimal
regulation occurs at the state, regional, or national level is contingent on being able to assess accurately the risks associated
with resource development.96
China undoubtedly has a number of laws that are able to
guarantee the protection of its water supplies in the fracking
process. Nonetheless, due to the general nontechnical content
of environmental laws and the lack of risk assessment, they
could be described as merely vague policy commitments rather
than substantive, enforceable legal instruments. Several Chinese extraction laws could be relevant regarding shale gas production. However, they shape an inconsistent and fragmented
93. The EIA should be topped by a seismological impact assessment on the
geological impact of shale gas operations on the stability of earth at or near
the well sites.
94. Environmental and Social Risk Briefing Oil & Gas, BARCLAYS (Mar.
2015),
https://www.home.barclays/content/dam/barclayspublic/docs/Citizenship/oiland-gas-guidance-note.pdf.
95. See the recently adopted legislation in Ohio on this point, S.B. 315.
96. Wiseman, supra note 7.
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combination of regulations addressing other nontraditional extractive industries and government directives on extraction.97
For instance, the Chinese policy on unconventional gas development and production partially reflects regulatory solutions
adopted for methane extraction from coal seams (Coalbed Methane or CBM).98 This would entail a series of import duty reductions or exemptions for technological imports that are used
for shale gas exploration, exemptions from the payment of exploration and extraction rights, and also production subsidies.99
The government is actually already referring to the policy developed for the CBM as a starting point to draft a policy related
to shale gas,100 especially regarding the environmental ap97. In particular, regulations crafted by the MEP deal with issues related
to emissions standards, surface draining systems, and restriction on gas
emission in the environment. Moreover, regulations developed by the MLR
outline the national policy on fees and royalties from mining prospects and
other fiscal-related concerns, while standard price-sharing contracts require
international energy enterprises to share large portions of their output with
the government besides paying corporate taxes on profits. Finally, land rights
and control of shale acreage are also governed by regulations issued by the
MLR and not directly by national oil companies.
98. CBM is a methane gas that is extracted from the coal seams existing in
some geological fields’ subsoil. Dameng Yu et al., A Review on Studies of
Coalbed Methane Reservoirs in China, 1 GEOLOGICAL SCI. & TECHN. INFO. 13
(2001); Qin Yong, Advances and Reviews on Research of Coalbed Gas Geology
in China, 3 GEOLOGICAL J. CHINA U. 2 (2003).
99. In this context, one must also evaluate whether the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
rules, especially Articles III and I that define the Agreement’s sphere of application and subject, find a match in the energy sector. For an in-depth
analysis of subsidies regulation within WTO legislation, see, in addition to
the cited volumes and note 20, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL,
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 687–734 (Patrick F. J. Macrory et al.
eds., 2005); JEFF WAINCYMER, WTO LITIGATION: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF
FORMAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 765–69 (2002); R. K. GUPTA, ANTI-DUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES: THE COMPLETE REFERENCE (1996); MICHAEL J.
TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
268-73 (3rd ed. 2005); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (John M. Olin Law & Economics Working
Paper No. 186, 2003). See also VALERIE DI COMITE, LE SOVVENZIONI E LE
MISURE COMPENSATIVE NELL’ORGANIZZAZIONE MONDIALE DEL COMMERCIO
(2009); M. Orlandi, La disciplina delle sovvenzioni concesse dagli Stati nella
normativa OMC, in QUADERNI DI STUDI EUROPEI. I SUSSIDI E GLI AIUTI DI STATO
(2002).
100. Don Kun Luo et al., Economic Evaluation Based Policy Analysis for
Coalbed Methane Industry in China, 36 ENERGY 360 (2011).
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proach developed in the CBM area.101 With regard to international cooperation policies, CBM exploration from foreign companies must occur pursuant to domestic laws regulating onshore oil resources in order to ensure a minimum standard of
environmental protection, which should be enhanced in the
shale gas field as well.102
The CBM legislation can also set an example with regard to
the fiscal policy applied for energy companies involved in the
unconventional gas production cycle. For example, every energy company operating in the CBM industry obtains a full refund of value-added tax.103 Similarly, the equipment and instrumentation required for exploration and developing operations are free of duties, import taxes, and value-added tax.104
Less onerous business income taxation is desirable as well.
With regard to this, the Chinese government set the business
income tax for independent national companies operating in
the CBM industry at the favorable rate of 25 percent starting
from 2008.105 Likewise, domestic energy companies cooperating
with foreign companies in the CBM industry benefit from a
preferential fiscal policy, under which they are exempted from
paying income tax for two years starting from the first incomeaccruing year. This mechanism might allow energy companies

101. Specifically, in July 2008, the MEP issued the Emission Standard of
CBM/CMM regarding new mines and surface drainage systems.
102. Technology development in the shale gas exploration and exploitation
field should be encouraged by the Chinese government as it already did in the
1983 National Programme on Research of Essential Technologies, through
which the government incentivized the development of technologies related to
CBM exploration and development. Baizhan Li & Runming Yao, Urbanisation and its Impact on Building Energy Consumption and Efficiency in China,
34 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1994 (2009). The development of innovative technologies in natural gas and oil exploration has been fostered also by the Mid-term
and Long-term Scientific and Technological Programme (2006-2020). Fourth
Globelics Conference in Mexico City, Report by Shulin Gu et al. on China’s
System and Vision of Innovation: Analysis of the National Medium- and
Long-term Science and Technology Development Plan for 2006–2020 (Sept.
22–24, 2008).
103. JANE NAKANO, DAVID PUMPHREY, ROBERT PRICE, JR. & MOLLY A.
WATSON, PROSPECTS FOR SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA EXAMINING
POTENTIALS AND CHALLENGES IN CHINA AND INDIA 7 (2012),
http://csis.org/files/publication/120911_Nakano_ProspectsShaleGas_Web.pdf.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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to face the high unconventional gas production initial costs,
therefore fostering investments and technological progress.
Given that the costs related to producing shale gas in China
are higher than conventional gas, a subsidy policy is advisable in
order to allow companies to join the sector. This technique has
already been implemented by the MOF regarding energy companies involved in the CBM sector in China, which are entitled
to a financial allowance of 0.02 renminbi per cubic meter when
the gas is exploited locally, sold for domestic use, or used as a
raw material for chemical processes.106 To that end, the Chinese government has introduced subsidies for shale gas industry development, offering mining enterprises operating in the
sector an allowance of 0.4 renminbi per cubic meter from 2012–
2015, which is twice the amount provided for the CBM sector,
though it has been observed that the allowance’s short duration
is not enough to draw foreign investment.107 Also, pursuant to
the Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue (effective since January 30, 2012), foreign investments in the shale
gas sector are subsumed under the “promotional” investment
category, which allows foreign investors to form joint ventures—including contractual ones—with their Chinese partners.108 Furthermore, equipment and technologies imported for
106. Sino Gas & Energy, Developing Chinese Unconventional Gas Assets,
Presentation
to
dbAccess
China
Conference
2014,
at
17,
http://sinogasenergy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/201401_China_unconventional_gas.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
107. Id.
108. NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, SHALE GAS HANDBOOK 53 (2013),
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/norton-rose-fulbright-shale-gashandbook-108992.pdf. See Catalogue of Encouraged Foreign Investment Industries, section
II. Mining and Quarrying Industries: . . . (6) Prospecting and exploitation of such conventional oil resources as oil shale, oil sand, heavy
oil and super heavy oil (limited to equity joint venture and contractual joint venture) . . . (9) Prospecting and exploitation of unconventional natural gas resources such as shale gas and submarine natural gas hydrate (limited to equity joint venture and contractual joint
venture).
Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries (Amended in
2011), MINISTRY OF COMMERCE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Feb. 21, 2012,
2:51
PM),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/aaa/201203/2012030802783
7.shtml.
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exploration and development of the shale gas industry that are
earmarked for that specific use and are not producible in China
are free of duties and customs tariffs.109
III. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS: FOCUS ON WATER
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
There are existing critical concerns about fresh water management in relation to unconventional gas.110 These two natural resources have come to be complexly associated because the
extraction, treatment, and distribution of fresh water entail
considerable energy, while the production of fossil fuel energy
involves fresh water.111 Water concerns associated with unconventional fossil fuel extraction and production are augmented
by growing demand from an increasing population and the influence of climate change on the hydrologic cycle.112 Shale gas
is a relatively clean and efficient burning fuel with the potential to lower carbon emissions. Nevertheless, risks remain, and
the role of shale gas in the world’s overall energy mix has been
met with fierce opposition due to environmental concerns over
hydraulic fracturing technology and its potential to cause environmental harm,113 due to its shallower deposits, greater permeability, and more superficial formations.
109. Desheng Hu & Shengqing Xu, Opportunity, Challenges and Policy
Choices for China on the Development of Shale Gas, 60 ENERGY POL’Y 21, 21–
26 (2013). See also the new Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue draft, the consultations of which closed on December 3, 2014.
110. A wider debate exists on the carbon footprint of unconventional gas.
See Robert H. Abrams & Noah D. Hall, Framing Water Policy in a Carbon
Affected and Carbon Constrained Environment, 50 NAT. RES. J. 3, 7 (2010).
111. As remarked by scholar Paula J. Schauwecker, “Water consumption
and oil consumption are on a precariously parallel course.” Paula J. Schauwecker, Oil and Water: Fueling Questions, 24 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 46, 47
(2009).
112. Robert E. Beck, Current Water Issues in Oil and Gas Development and
Production: Will Water Control What Energy We Have?, 49 WASHBURN L.J.
423, 424 (2010) (remarking that there are no fresh water alternatives, and
water cannot be replaced). Consequentially, given the overlap between energy and water, both lawmakers and scientists must account for these interconnections, as they model and manage the hydrologic cycle.
113. The focus of this study on environmental aspects related to shale gas
exploration and extraction should not render one oblivious of the other issues
that may impact the development of global unconventional gas resources:
fiscal conditions, landowner acceptance, interference from local authorities,
pipeline and infrastructure issues, availability of technology, equipment and
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Fracking involves drilling a well bore into a reservoir rock
formation and then forcing water, sand, and chemicals into the
well at high pressures to create fractures or fissures in the
rock. Once the fracture is open, the released gas flows out of
the fractures and into the well bore. In addition to shale gas,
the process has recently been applied to extract gas from coal
seams and tight sand deposits.114
These considerations mean that the extent to which shale gas
becomes a larger element of the energy mix will depend on balancing environmental protection against economic growth.
Some U.S. states and some EU countries, such as France, have
already banned or imposed moratoria115 on hydraulic fracturing
due to environmental concerns116 in attempts to harmonize environmental risks with energy security benefits. Conversely,
China may opt for accepting greater environmental risks in order to bolster shale gas production and thus satisfy growing
domestic energy demands, as well as create new jobs that fullscale production would generate, particularly for low-skilled
workers.117 However, bearing in mind the relevant geological
factors, infrastructure challenges, and environmental hazards,
it is one thing to find shale gas, and another to obtain commercially viable production from it.
skilled labor force, and gas players’ experience. See, e.g., Susan L. Sakmar,
The Global Shale Gas Initiative: Will the United States Be the Role Model for
the Development of Shale Gas Around the World?, 33 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 369
(2011).
114. NAHED TAHER, BANDAR AL-HAJJA, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT IN SAUDI
ARABIA: CONCERNS & OPPORTUNITIES 139 (2013).
115. Moratoria represents a precautionary measure par excellence. ARIE
TROUWBORST, PRECAUTIONARY RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES 129 (2006). See
also Jeffrey C. King, Selected Re-Emerging and Emerging Trends in Oil and
Gas Law as Result of Production from Shale Formations, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN
L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2011); Thomas Swartz, Hydraulic Fracturing: Risks and Risk
Management, 26 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 30, 30 (2011).
116. The French Senate approved a ban on fracking in June 2011, as a result of extensive public protest. However, fracking is still permitted for scientific testing. See Ruven Fleming, Shale Gas––A Comparison of European
Moratoria, 1 EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 12 (2013).
117. In the United States, the shale gas industry has created six hundred
thousand new jobs. Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Shale Gas Production Subcommittee 90-Day Report 1, 5 (Aug. 18, 2011),
http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/resources/081811_90_day_report_final.pdf.
See generally Thomas C. Kinnaman, The Economic Impact of Shale Gas Extraction: A Review of Existing Studies, 70 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1243 (2011).
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As the creation of fracking fluid entails mixing of millions of
gallons of fresh water with thousands of gallons of chemicals,118
it is crucial to assess how harmful the fracking process might
be to the environment.119 First, hydraulic fracturing is supposedly responsible for a number of incidences of seismic activity,
such as minor earthquakes and tremors. These seismic activities seem to be caused by either the fracking process itself or
the injection of fracking wastewater into wells.120 So far, there
has been a more than a four-fold increase in earthquakes of
magnitude three and greater in the central United States since
2008, that are “almost certainly” caused by fracking activities.121 Similarly, in April and May 2011, shale gas exploratory
drilling has been suspended in Lancashire, United Kingdom,
following two earthquakes with magnitudes of 1.5 and 2.3.122 A
consequent report commissioned by the Cuadrilla Resources
Ltd.,123 the British company exploring for natural shale gas in
118. See Wes Deweese, Fracturing Misconceptions: A History of Effective
State Regulation, Groundwater Protection, and the Ill-Conceived FRAC Act, 6
Okla. J. L. & Tech., no. 49, 2010, at 2. The EPA reports that hazardous fluids
employed in fracking are often injected into shale formations at high volumes
(a maximum average of 150,000 gallons per well, and a minimum average of
57,500 gallons per well). United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, Final Report on
Evaluation of Impacts to Underground Sources of Drinking Water by Hydraulic Fracturing of Coalbed Methane Reservoirs 3–11 (June 2004) [hereinafter
EPA
2004],
https://fracfocus.org/sites/default/files/publications/evaluation_of_impacts_to_
underground_sources_of_drinking_water_by_hydraulic_fracturing_of_coalbed_met
hane_reservoirs.pdf.
119. On the risks related to shale gas development, see generally Mark Zoback et al., Addressing the Environmental Risks from Shale Gas Development, (Worldwide Inst., Briefing Paper 1, 2010); Burleson, supra note 63, at
329. On the potential health hazards, see Michelle Bamberger & Robert E.
Oswald, Impacts of Gas Drilling on Human and Animal Health, 22 New Solutions: J. Envtl. & Occupational Health Pol’y 51, 57–77 (2012).
120. Zoback, supra note 119, at 9.
121. Ajay Makan, Fracking Water Linked to Earthquakes, FIN. TIMES (Apr.
14, 2012, 1:28 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e268a268-84f6-11e1-a3c500144feab49a.html#axzz2gMxH4mz3.
122. C. A. Green, P. Styles & B.J. Baptie, Preese Hall Shale Gas Fracturing:
Review and Recommendation for Induced Seismic Mitigation 1 (2012),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/15745/5075-preese-hall-shale-gas-fracturing-review.pdf.
123. Dep’t of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), Fracking UK Shale: Understanding
Earthquake
Risk
5
(2014),
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the Bowland Basin in Lancashire, indicated that “it is highly
probable that the hydraulic fracturing of Cuadrilla’s Preese
Hall-1 well did trigger a number of minor seismic events.”124
This of course has relevant implications for local residential
and infrastructure damage. Seismic activity could also impact
a well’s integrity and cause further underground water contamination, as it could create leakages and new fractures, besides deforming well casings. Seismic activity can break or
shear well casings as well, which is particularly dangerous in
earthquake zones. This means that even if technical precautions to block off sensitive upper-level groundwater zones are
taken, damaged casing could result in leaks, especially in environments physically under pressure. Moreover, Sichuan province, where most of the Chinese shale gas is located, is a region
extremely prone to earthquakes; for example, the 2008 Great
Sichuan Earthquake resulted in 69,195 deaths and over 18,300
missing.125
In addition to the risks related to seismic activities, principal
concerns include groundwater contamination with fracking
chemicals,126 gasification,127 water usage risks, surface water
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/283837/Seismic_v3.pdf.
124. Press Release Geomechanical Study, CUADRILLA RESOURCES (Feb. 11,
2011) http://www.cuadrillaresources.com/news/cuadrilla-news/article/pressrelease-geomechanical-study/.
125. Xinglin Lei et al., A Detailed View of the Injection‐Induced Seismicity
in a Natural Gas Reservoir in Zigong, Southwestern Sichuan Basin, China, 118 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES.: SOLID EARTH 4296 (2013); Michael Esposito,
Water Issues Set the Pace for Fracking Regulations and Global Shale Gas
Extraction, 22 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 167 (2013); Nicola Jones, Wastewater
Injection Cracks Open Quake Concerns, 6 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 329, 329
(2013); William L. Ellsworth, Injection-Induced Earthquakes, SCIENCE, July
12, 2013; Bob Weinhold, Energy Development Linked with Earthquakes, 120
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. a388 (2012); Thomas W. Merrill, Four Questions About
Fracking, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 971 (2013).
126. Currently, China does not have a regulatory framework aimed at ensuring that wastewater injection into underground wells does not endanger
groundwater. Such regulations would ensure that wastewater injection into
underground wells, including injection of hazardous wastewater produced
from hydraulic fracturing, would not endanger local water supplies. Lan Nan,
Legal Tools for Groundwater Protection: Insights from International Experience, 8 CHINA J. NAT. RESOURCES ECON. 33–43 (2011).
127. When gas migrates into groundwater, the build-up of pressure due to
gasification may lead to tremors or explosions. Aquifer gasification due to
shale gas development has been cited as a potential cause for recent minor
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and soil risks spills, and blow-outs. Conversely, environmentalists argue that, although hydraulic fracturing is believed to be
less water intensive than nuclear energy and coal production, it
is unlikely that it will replace either energy source.128 Rather,
shale gas development carries the danger of creating an additional demand for water. Shortage of water is one of the most
crucial issues facing shale gas development in China, as water
is a fundamental element in the fracking process. In the shale
gas-rich Sichuan Basin, this is a primary concern due to the
province’s agricultural legacy that furnishes the country with
roughly 7 percent of its rice, wheat, and other grains.129 There
are three possible outcomes for the water used during fracking:
(1) it can be extracted, recycled, and used again; (2) it can be
left inside of the shale deposit; or (3) it can be extracted and
stored on or off site or treated for other uses.130
The use of recycled water for hydraulic operations is highly
advisable, given the intense residential and industrial demand
for water in Sichuan and water scarcity concerns in Xinjiang.131
Regulations should also consider the possibility of establishing
a closed-loop system of energy production, using mine-drainage
seismic activity in the United Kingdom, though these claims are largely unproven at this point and are being investigated. See KPMG GLOB. ENERGY
INST., supra note 51.
128. Bridget R. Scanlon et al., Drought and the Water–Energy Nexus in
Texas,
8
ENVTL.
RES.
LETT.
1
(2013),
http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/8/4/045033/pdf;
JeanPhillipe Nicot & Bridget R. Scanlon, Water Use for Shale-Gas Production in
Texas, 46 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 3580 (2012); Ian J. Laurenzi & Gilbert R. Jersey,
Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Freshwater Consumption of Marcellus Shale Gas, 47 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 4896 (2013).
129. Joel Kirkland, China Begins to Tap Its Shale Gas, Despite Daunting
Technological, Environmental Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/10/14/14climatewire-china-begins-to-tapits-shale-gas-despite-da-95706.html?pagewanted=all
130. Deweese, supra note 118, at 19. Schauwecker, supra note 111, at 47.
Gas drillers are experimenting with new technologies and methods empowering them to be more effective at recycling fracking water. See the use of “mobile heated distillation units” by Devon Energy Corporation as an example of
emerging efficiencies. See Laura C. Reeder, Creating a Legal Framework for
Regulation of Natural Gas Extraction from the Marcellus Shale Formation,
34 WM. & MARY ENVT’L L. & POL’Y REV. 999, 1013 (2010).
131. Zmarak Shalizi, Addressing China’s Growing Water Shortages and
Associated Social and Environmental Consequences 6 (World Bank, Policy
Res.
Working
Paper
No.
3895,
2006),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=923238.
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water from coal production (after having neutralized and removed heavy metals), thus integrating industrial ecology practices into the fracking process. However, this practice should
only be implemented after groundwater regulations are
strengthened, and after China has gained substantial experience in minimizing pollution from fracturing operations, while
also ensuring the proper disposal of the heavy-metal waste
products from treating these industrial water sources.132
Water is an especially urgent issue for China as its per capita
availability of drinking water is very low, and water resources
are not well distributed throughout the country.133 Diverging
water supplies from agriculture to shale gas production could
be catastrophic, in particular if the contaminated water also
pollutes farmlands. Conversely, for other shale gas basins in
Tarim, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, the scarcity of water is
aggravated by the arid and hot climate. Shale gas exploration
and production would thus require water to be carried from
other parts of the country, which would raise costs unsustainably and impact the environment. Furthermore, climate change
and China’s rapid economic development have led to an increase in industrial and agricultural water consumption, while
areas of desertification are expanding, deteriorating the ecological environment which is already overexploited.134 In China,
water availability for hydraulic fracturing may significantly
reduce the prospective for national shale development in certain areas. Figure 1 draws attention to these potential water
132. For example, in November 2011, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection released a statement encouraging the oil and gas industry to utilize recycled mine drainage water in hydraulic fracturing. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., DEP Effort Encourages Oil and Gas Industry to
Use
Mine
Drainage
Water
(Nov.
18,
2011),
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/newsroom/14287?id
=19161&typeid=1.
133. Roberto Soprano, China and the Recognition and Protection of the Human Right to Water, in CHINA’S INFLUENCE ON NON-TRADE CONCERNS IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Paolo Davide Farah & Elena Cima ed., forthcoming 2016).
134. On desertification and water management in China, see CI LONGJUN &
XAIOHUI WANG, DESERTIFICATION AND ITS CONTROL IN CHINA (2010). There is
clearly tension between economic self-sufficiency in agriculture and in energy. Mark Harvey, & Sarah Pilgrim, The New Competition for Land: Food,
Energy, and Climate Change, 36 FOOD POL’Y 1 (2011); Jörg Friedrichs, Global
Energy Crunch: How Different Parts of the World Would React to a Peak Oil
Scenario, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 4562, 4562–69 (2010).
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scarcity issues in China, which are likely to make the costs of
shale development exorbitant.
Figure 2. China Shale Resource and Water Stress Map. Map
replicated from “Natural Gas Weekly Kaleidoscope,” Barclay’s
Capital Commodities Research (November 16, 2010).
A. Implementation and Enforcement of Energy and Environmental Laws: Fragmentation of Competences
China’s poor law enforcement has undermined the efficacy of
past efforts. In particular, China features a highly fragmented
water-resources management system. Horizontally, several institutions are involved at every level of government. At the central level, the National People’s Congress and State Council
enact laws and administrative regulations and supervise their
local implementation and enforcement. Additionally, several
ministries and authorities are responsible in different ways in
water management.135
135. The Ministry of Water Resources, which is a leading agency for integrated water resource management, water resource protection planning, water function zoning, monitoring water quantity, and quality in rivers and
lakes, issues water resource extraction permits and proposes water pricing
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Figure 3. Water management competences allocation in China
(Xie, Jian; Liebenthal, Andres; Warford, Jeremy J., Addressing
China’s Water Scarcity: A Synthesis of Recommendations for
Selected Water Resource Management Issues, 2008, World Bank
Publications).
This unwieldy regime carries the risks of creating both overlaps and friction in responsibility, as the lines of demarcation
between institutional jurisdictions and competences are not
policy; the MEP, specifically competent for water pollution laws, regulations
and standards supervision and enforcement, and monitoring of water quality;
the Ministry of Housing and Urban and Rural Construction; the Ministry of
Agriculture; the Ministry of Land and Resources; the State Forest Administration; the Ministry of Transportation; the State Oceanic Administration;
the NDRC; and the MOF. A common expression to describe the current system is that “nine dragons” manage the water. See JIAN XIE ET AL., ADDRESSING
CHINA’S WATER SCARCITY 30 (2009); Jiang Yong, China’s Water Scarcity, 90 J.
ENVTL. MGMT. 3185, 3190–91 (2009). Wang Xinbo, Water Governance in China: The Failure of a Top-Down Approach, in THE WATER REVOLUTION:
PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO WATER SCARCITY 149–71 (Barun Mitra et al. eds.,
2006); Yan Feng et al., Water Resources Administration Institution in China,
8 WATER POL’Y 291 (2006).
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always clear. Even the responsibility for water pollution prevention and control, which should be a fundamental step in the
shale gas extraction process, is distributed to different governmental bodies. Vertically, the water-management regime features similar fragmentation, and relies on unclear administrative boundaries linked to different levels of government. Finally, the political friction and informational asymmetry between
central and local governments block more meaningful cohesive
action. The absence of an overarching energy law causes overlaps and contentious bureaucratic infighting that have a detrimental effect on the ability to face long-term energy challenges. In fact, not just water management but energy governance
as a whole has been decentralized during the course of several
rounds of administrative reorganizations, dispersing and scattering the country’s decentralized energy authority among parallel central ministries.136
It remains to be seen what the implications will be for shale
gas industry expansion in China, whether this fragmentation
will further hamper its development or whether these challenges will be adequately met by a more integrated system, inspired, for instance, by the water-resource management systems of France and the United Kingdom.137 Given the fact that
in China levels of pollution from industry and agriculture are
dangerously high, shale gas should be developed and extracted
relying on a regulatory and institutional framework capable of
reducing any related environmental hazards, striking a balance between energy security benefits and environmental costs,
in order to guarantee the right to water universally.138 The
136. Bo Kong, Governing China’s Energy in the Context of Global Governance, 2 GLOBAL POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 51, 52–63 (2011).
137. Those water-resource management systems specifically aim at ensuring the security of water supplies, protecting ecological resources of the water
environment, and improving the efficiency of local water supply and
wastewater treatment. Those regulatory objectives are achieved through different instruments, inter alia, consensual agreements among all stakeholders
and technical advice. The ﬁnancial resources originated from water pricing
and the enforcement of the consumer-pays principle for quantitative management and the polluter-pays principle for pollution control. Id.
138. Recognition of the right to water has been debated in a number of international law fora. The right to water is a crucial element in the work of
the Human Rights Council, the U.N. General Assembly, many scholars, and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In September 2010, a resolution
adopted by consensus by the Human Rights Council affirmed that the right to
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recognition of such a right would be a first good step, but
should be followed by effective policy implementation and enforcement.139

water and sanitation is recognized in existing international law. See Human
Rights Council Res. 15/L.14, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/L.14 (Sept. 24, 2010). In
2010, China voted in favor of a U.N. General Assembly resolution recognizing
the right to water as a human right. G.A. Res. 64/292, The Human Right to
Water and Sanitation (Aug. 3, 2010). This Resolution acknowledges that
clean drinking water and sanitation are integral to the realization of all human rights. Accordingly, the right to water imposes a burden on China to
develop new policies and rules to ensure safe drinking water for its population. However, the resolution does not have a legally binding effect, and is
generally regarded as a soft law legal instrument. The vote in favor of the
U.N. General Assembly resolution is an important first step, but China
should pursue formal recognition of the right to water in international and
domestic laws in order to grant its citizens legal entitlement against the state
in case of serious interferences with the enjoyment of the right to water,
which requires the state to adopt, inter alia, effective legislation to restrain
third parties from polluting water resources. Jade Harsha, Conflicts and Dilemma of Human Right to Water, 100 CURRENT SCI. 1178, 1778 (2011). It is
nevertheless uncertain what incentives China has to take such a step, and
whether this scenario is plausible at all. In fact in China new regulations
have been adopted to protect the environment, but lack of control and enforcement measures remains a crucial problem. Recognition of the right to
water within the national political and legal systems by way of legislative
implementation would constitute a step in the right direction, but it should
be accompanied by monitoring and enforcement measures. The right to water
is not recognized at the constitutional level in China. Article 9 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China [Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Xianfa, Di Jiu Tiao] states:
mineral resources, waters, forests, mountains, grassland, unreclaimed land, beaches and other natural resources are owned by the
State, that is, by the whole people, with the exception of the forests,
mountains, grasslands, unclaimed land, and beaches that are owned
by collectivities in accordance with the law. The State ensures the
rational use of natural resources and protects rare animals and
plants. The appropriation or damage of natural resources by any organization or individual by whatever means is prohibited.
As previously mentioned, provisions on supply and sanitation are included in
secondary resources, inter alia, P.R.C. Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, supra note 62. William C. Jones, The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 707 (1985).
139. Peter Gleick, China and Water, in THE WORLD’S WATER: THE BIENNIAL
REPORT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES 79, 94-95 (Peter H. Gleick et al. eds.,
2008).
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Many factors contributed to the currently weak enforcement
of environmental regulations in China. The breakthrough of
shale gas exploration and production in China is undermined
by the country’s unsatisfactory record on environmental enforcement, which jeopardizes the capacity of existing laws to
both prevent and minimize the downsides of hydraulic fracturing.140 China relies on a multilevel system of authority based
on central supervision of local governments to guarantee adequate legal enforcement. Environmental regulations are accordingly enforced at the local level through central Government Regional Supervision Centers (“RSCs”) and local governments’ Environmental Protection Bureaus, which are responsible for supervising the implementation of central laws, investigating major pollution events, coordinating and settling transboundary environmental disputes, and receiving and responding to complaints.141 However, the efficiency of the government
RSCs is weakened by several constraints. The RSCs are extremely underfunded, which results in weak governmental enforcement capacity, and are financed by local governments,
causing conflicts of interest, corruption, and complicity.142
Moreover, the RSCs lack enforcement authority over local government Environmental Protection Bureaus. To overcome
these hindrances, the RSC’s role should be reinforced by
providing specific legal tools and conferring to the centers more
adequate funding and greater powers.
B. Transparency and Disclosure about Fracking Activities:
Evaluating the Chinese and U.S. Approaches
Other factors not limited to the area of water pollution control and prevention contribute to current weak law enforcement in China. In particular, the existing legal instruments
lack enforcement mechanisms and procedures, namely supervision, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation. The enforcement of
environmental laws could be improved through legal instruments that facilitate access of the general public to information
and statistics in order to foster a positive feedback mechanism
140. See generally Wang, supra note 69.
141. Scott Moore, Commentary: Shifting Power in Central-Local Environmental Governance in China: The Regional Supervision Centers, 11 CHINA
ENV’T SERIES 188, 188 (2011).
142. Id. at 191.
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that could exercise greater pressure on local or central government to enforce existing regulations.143
These transparency measures have already contributed to
filling the gap between central and regional regulations for the
oil industry in both the United States and China. In 1986, the
United States adopted the Emergency Planning and Right to
Know Act (EPCRA),144 which fosters and promotes emergency
preparedness by asking local and federal governments to publicize precise information about the presence of potential chemical risks.145 Similarly, the Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) Toxic Release Inventory (“TRI”)146 maintains a searchable database of toxic chemical releases and waste-management
activities whose aim is to inform and guide policy decisions of
local communities and federal government, enhancing participatory mechanisms. However, U.S. shale gas companies are
not required by federal law to disclose the chemicals being used
for hydraulic fracturing. Although to date, eleven states have
passed laws requiring drilling companies to reveal some,
though not all, of the chemicals they use. The U.S. Groundwater Protection Council and Department of Energy (DOE) have
also developed a web-based national registry called “FracFocus,” which allows the public to access information, on a wellby-well basis, on chemical constituents used in hydraulic fracturing.147 Moreover in some states, such as Texas148 and Colo143. Ma Jun, The Power of Public Disclosure, CHINA DIALOGUE (Dec. 13,
2010) https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4001-The-powerof-public-disclosure.
144. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), 40
C.F.R. §§ 355, 370, 372 (2015); EPCRA: Section 313, E.P.A. Doc. 260/K010001 (Feb. 2001).
145. EPCRA §§ 311–12 (2011).
146. TRI was established in 1986 by the EPCRA. In 1990, Congress passed
the Pollution Prevention Act (PPA), which required that facilities report additional data on waste management and source reduction activities under TRI.
The TRI-specific sections of these two laws are Section 313 of the EPCRA and
Section 6607 of the PPA. Toxic Release Inventory Program, UNITED STATES
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-triprogram (last updated Mar. 14, 2016).
147. On the role of FracFocus and its implications, see generally Leah A.
Dundon, Mark Abkowitz & Janey Camp, The Real Value of FracFocus as a
Regulatory Tool: A National Survey of State Regulators, 87 ENERGY POL’Y 496
(2015); Katherine Konschnik & Archana Dayalu, Hydraulic Fracturing
Chemicals Reporting: Analysis of Available Data and Recommendations for
Policymakers, 88 ENERGY POL’Y 504 (2016).
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rado,149 disclosure on FracFocus is a mandatory legislative requirement. The case against mandating the disclosure of hydraulic fracturing chemicals is that “[t]he specific make-up of
the chemicals used in fracturing in particular is considered
proprietary information and should be protected.”150 Conversely, it should be kept in mind that considerable knowledge gaps
about the effects of hydraulic fracturing on water, hence public
health, still exist.
One embryonic tendency in the United States is that shale
gas operators are starting to voluntarily publish the chemicals
employed in their hydraulic fracturing processes. For instance,
Aubrey McClendon (Former President and Chief Executive Officer of Chesapeake Energy) and John Pinkerton (Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer of Range Resources Inc.) have specified that their companies will make publicly available a list of
chemicals used.151 In 2009, in regards to legislative responses,
the Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act
(FRAC Act) was proposed in attempts to close the loophole exempting companies drilling for natural gas from disclosing the
chemicals involved in fracking operations that would normally
be required under federal clean water laws.152 An attempt was
made to introduce the FRAC Act in 2009, and on March 15,
2011, U.S. Representatives Diana DeGette and Jared Polis reintroduced it to Congress.153 Congress had not yet passed either
148. The Texas legislature enacted legislation in mid-2011 that directed the
Texas Railroad Commission (which regulates oil and gas activity in Texas) to
draft regulations that require companies to disclose fracturing fluid composition on a well-by-well basis by posting information on FracFocus. The Commission complied with the directive, enacting such regulations in December
2011. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.851(a)(1)(A) (West 2012). 75; TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.29 (2012).
149. COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:205A (2012).
150. Deweese, supra note 118, at 11.
151. Id. at 12–13; see also Timothy Gardner & Sarah N. Lynch, Despite
Probe, SEC Says Not Regulating Fracking, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2011, 3:58
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/15/us-usasec-frackingidUSTRE78E5NK20110915.
152. On the FRAC Act, see generally SUSAN L. SAKMAR, ENERGY FOR THE
21ST CENTURY: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS
(LNG) 316 (2013).
153. David O. Williams, DeGette, Polis Once Again Introduce FRAC Act to
Bring Federal Oversight to Gas Fracking, COLO. INDEP. (Mar. 15, 2011, 5:47
PM),
http://coloradoindependent.com/79273/degettepolis-once-againintroduce-frac-act-to-bring-federal-oversight-to-gas-fracking.
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of the FRAC Act bills. This bill was reassigned as number S.
785 to a congressional committee on March 18, 2015, which will
consider the bill before possibly sending it on to the House or
Senate as a whole.154
In China, transparency initiatives are growing in order to
tackle information shortcomings. The Water Law155 requires
the environmental protection administration departments of
the local people’s governments to periodically disclose pollution
quantity control targets.156 This legal tool also requires the Environmental Protection Administration Department of the
State Council and local governments to “name and shame” local
governments157 who fail to meet their quantity control targets.158 The first ministry-level disclosure law is the Measures
on Open Environmental Information (for Trial Implementation) was passed on February 8, 2007, by the MEP in order to
foster public participation in fighting pollution.159 The
measures require companies to timely and accurately disclose
their environmental information160 and promote citizen involvement, in that “citizens, legal persons and other organiza154. Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act, S.
785, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s785.
155. See P.R.C. Law on Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, supra
note 62.
156. Id. art. 19.
157. Even before the Water Law was approved, some laws fostering transparency and public participation had been adopted, such as the Clean Production Law of 2003, which required emissions and other environmental data. Furthermore, the Environmental Impact Assessment Law of 2003 requires partial public disclosure of the environmental impact assessments
completed for permit applications. P.R.C. Law on Environmental Impact Assessment (promulgated by Order No. 77 of the President of the People’s Republic of China, Oct. 28, 2002, effective Sept. 1, 2003).
158. Id.
159. Measures on Open Environmental Information (for Trial Implementation) (adopted by the State Environmental Protection Administration of China, Feb. 8, 2007, effective May 1, 2008).
160. Article 4 provides:
Environmental protection departments shall observe the principles
of justice, fairness, convenience to the people and objectivity and disclose government environmental information promptly and accurately. Enterprises shall disclose enterprise environmental information
promptly and accurately under the principle of combining voluntary
disclosure with mandatory disclosure.
Id. art. 4.
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tions” are allowed to “ask environmental protection departments to obtain government environmental information.”161
Despite the progress made by Chinese local governments regarding transparency and disclosure of environmental information, differences among provinces and regions remain. In
particular, disclosure of the environmental impact by large energy companies is limited, and, being big taxpayers, the government generally sits by when they refuse to disclose their
environmental information. Another hurdle is related to the
normative nature of these regulations, which do not usually
impose mandatory environmental disclosure requirements on
enterprises, but merely encourage companies to take their own
initiative in providing information.
Environmental disclosure and transparency directly affect
social acceptance, which is a key element for the long-term success of shale gas development, as previous North American experience shows.162 It is crucial to developing mutual-trust and
mutual-benefit relations between the shale gas industry and
local communities. This would minimize the social risk for the
developer, while involving the community in the decisionmaking process, and ensuring tangible and equitable benefits
from the project. In this vein, strong transparency initiatives
and mandatory disclosure of environmental information represents a crucial step towards safer regulation of shale gas development and better enforcement of domestic environmental
laws.

161. Id. art. 5.
162. On this point, see Eleanor Bayley, Conflict Sensitivity of the Shale Gas
Industry,
NEWCLIMATEFORPEACE.ORG,
(Sept.
17,
2015),
https://www.newclimateforpeace.org/blog/nrm-and-conflict-%E2%80%93conflict-sensitivity-shale-gas-industry. Bayley states,
Where there is a lack of disclosure from companies over policies and
plans for meeting environmental standards and strong opposition
from environmental groups, coupled with only nascent independent
research and analysis on the environmental impacts of fracking and
strong national and international anti-fracking campaigns can result
in mis-information, thus clouding effective discussion and contributing to company-community misunderstanding and conflict.
Id.
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH THE PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES: A MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT FOR THE
UNCONVENTIONAL GAS MARKET?
Although there are clear differences between China and the
United States in the context of shale gas, further analysis reveals important similarities. Shale gas is a pivotal factor for
the future of energy in both countries, where energy security,
energy efficiency, and environmental concerns are deeply intertwined. These two countries strive to guarantee greater energy
security by boosting domestic resources.163 Additionally, their
regulatory frameworks share similarities, as both have farreaching federal or central laws enforced by designated agencies. Furthermore, both countries exhibit a gap between the
formulation of federal or central law and their enforcement at
the local level. These similarities between the U.S. and Chinese
energy systems allow for the drawing of parallels that could be
beneficial to the Chinese shale gas industry.164
For the purposes of this article, it is useful to analyze the factors that allowed the United States to trigger what is called the
“shale revolution.”165 Shale gas industry development has deeply altered the U.S. energy scenario, allowing the transition
from energy shortage to energy abundance, and the country—
globally at the top of the list for energy consumption—could
163. See generally INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK SPECIAL
REPORT:
ENERGY
AND
CLIMATE
CHANGE
(2015),
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/weo-2015special-report-energy-climate-change.html.
164. However, the two countries have different geological characteristics.
Hydraulic fracturing in China is much more geographically challenging than
it is in the United States, mainly because Chinese shale gas is found in much
rougher and deeper terrain than U.S. shale gas. Hence, the expertise derived
from the U.S. shale industry may not be directly adaptable to China, as it
would demand more experienced staff, supplementary equipment, technological innovation and augmented costs. Additionally, the quality of the shale
rock and gas in China is also different than that in the United States, as it is
more difficult to be fractured and contains much more non-hydrocarbon gasses. This means that Chinese shale gas is of a lower quality, and consequentially may be costly in the long-term, as China may be compelled to define
ways to render the gas more usable. See generally, Liu Honglin, The Drilling
and Completion Technology of Shale Gas and Its Status Reservoir Stimulation Technology in Foreign, and Our Adaptive Analysis, in SENIOR SYMPOSIUM
OF NATIONAL OIL AND GAS WELL ENGINEERING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRESS
AND DRILLING ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGY (2009) (in Chinese).
165. STEVENS, supra note 17.
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soon become the main hydrocarbon producer.166 Shale gas is
already influencing global energy relationships by replacing oil
in the new global energy balance, and its impact will be even
clearer when its first export starts in 2017.167 In the United
States there are many liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) platforms,
which originally were built to import gas but are now being
converted for shale gas export, if possible towards Europe, India, and China. This shift aimed to widen the political and
commercial sphere of influence of the United States in global
energy safety and related geopolitical relationships, as well as
for reducing the near Russian and Middle Eastern monopoly in
the natural gas industry.168 The shale gas revolution has altered hydrocarbon-production economic assets in the United
States, reducing dependency on imports and strengthening the
domestic manufacturing sector, thanks to reduced energy
costs.169 It is therefore useful to analyze the factors that have

166. MARY LASHLEY BARCELLA & DAVID HOBBS, IHS CERA, FUELING NORTH
AMERICA’S ENERGY FUTURE, at I-6 (2009). See also John Deutch, The Good
News about Gas-The Natural Gas Revolution and Its Consequences, 90
FOREIGN AFF. 82 (2011); John Deutch, The US Natural-Gas Boom Will Transform
the
World, WALL ST. J.
(Aug.
14,
2012,
6:53
PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303343404577514622469426
012. As a consequence of the shale gas revolution, the North American gas
basin, currently estimable at 3–400 billion cubic feet, could bear current energy consumption for more than one-hundred years. See Yergin, supra note
26, at 332.
167. Cuckoo Paul, Will Shale Gas Trigger a New World Order?,
FORBES INDIA (Aug. 5, 2013), http://forbesindia.com/blog/businessstrategy/will-shale-gas-trigger-a-new-world-order/#ixzz3xo2MwosF.
168. James T. Jensen, Presentation to the Paris Energy Club: LNG Exports from North America: How Competitive Are They Likely to Be? (May 4,
2012).
169. Starting in 2007, the increase in domestic gas production has led to a
significant gas surplus that demand could not completely absorb. As has been
observed by the U.S. Energy Information Agency in its 2013 Annual Outlook
on Energy:
The US Energy Information Agency . . . forecasts that natural gas
production in the United States will grow from 23 billions of cubic
feet in 2011 to 33.1 billions of cubic feet in 2040, with a 44% increase. Almost the entirety of this increase in domestic natural gas
production is due to the forecast boost in shale gas production, that
will switch from 7.8 billions of cubic feet in 2011 to 16.7 billions of
cubic feet in 2040.
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influenced U.S. policies on unconventional gas. Shale gas industry development in the United States has greatly benefitted
from the regulatory regime that developed on the basis of the
pattern of “cooperative federalism.”170 The entire process is
governed by complex state and federal agencies that deal, respectively, with drilling operations and the monitoring of water
treatment and disposal activities. Despite this division of competences, in practice the federal government has delegated a
considerable portion of its powers to the states that provide for
identical or better standards than the minimum ones set at the
federal level. As a consequence, at the state level, shale gas
regulation varies widely, depending on the specific interest and
on political assessments in relation to the extraction of this resource.171 Due to this wide regulatory fragmentation, federal
What Is Shale Gas and Why Is It Important?, ZERORPM (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://www.zerorpm.com/about/zerorpm-difference/blog/entry/what-is-shalegas-and-why-is-it-important. In 2000, shale gas represented only 1 percent of
the U.S. natural gas demand. David Brooks, Shale Gas Revolution, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2011, at A31. In 2012, its percentage has increased to 30 percent. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2013 WITH
PROJECTIONS TO 2040, at 9–10, DOE/EIA-0383 (2013). The most important
incentive to increasing natural gas demand in the United States has been the
electrical production achieved by replacing coal-powered plants or by increasing existent production capacity. At the same time, exports have the potential
to facilitate demand development and make the natural gas sector more competitive. Finally, an increase in gas demand could be engendered by a series
of factors, such as the use of natural gas vehicles, electricity production, and
gas demand for industrial purposes. Kenneth W. Costello, Exploiting
the Abundance of U.S. Shale Gas: Overcoming Obstacles to Fuel Switching and Expanding the Gas Distribution System, 34 ENERGY L.J. 542, 543–44
(2013).
170. Francis Gradijan, State Regulations, Litigation, and Hydraulic Fracturing, 7 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 47 (2012).
171. For example, New York requires a comprehensive environmental impact assessment, an application to gain the permission to start drilling, and a
preventive procedure plan. In Texas, drilling permission is granted easily,
provided that every project presented is accompanied by an environmental
impact assessment. On the different state regulations in the United States,
see in general David H. Getches, Groundwater Quality Protection: Setting a
National Goal for State and Federal Programs, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 387, 410
(1989); Mark A. Latham, The BP Deepwater Horizon: A Cautionary Tale for
Ccs, Hydrofracking, Geoengineering and Other Emerging Technologies with
Environmental and Human Health Risks, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
31, 56 (2011); Hannah Wiseman, Fracturing Regulation Applied, 22 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 361 (2012). Such differentiation among state legislations
becomes evident through analysis of regulation of the “Marcellus” shale gas
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minimum standards have often been ignored or applied with a
wide margin of discretion according to the political line of the
concerned state.172 Standardization over this differentiated apfield, where every state involved executes different regulatory frameworks,
while complying with federal principles, which only set minimum requirements for fracking activities. More specifically, noxious waste and toxic chemical transportation are governed by federal transport acts. The Clean Water
Act prohibits the release of pollutants in a watercourse without specific authorization. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1971). Federal law
lays down various forms of liability for the pollution of sites intended to be
used for well drilling, in compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA), aiming at “protecting public health and regulating the supply of
drinkable water at the national level.” Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. 93523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974). Similarly, the EPA has the task to issue regulations regarding fluid introduction in the subsoil, so as to protect potable subterranean aquifers. Until 1997, the EPA interpreted the definition of “subterranean introduction” contained in Section 300 of the SDWA as not applying
to the subterranean storage of fluids, and excluding oil and natural gas extraction techniques, including fracking. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d); Cupas, supra
note 55, at 605–06. This interpretation was overruled in Legal Environmental
Assistance Foundation v. U.S. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467 (11th Cir. 1997), where
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the SDWA interpretation
followed by the EPA was wrong, and that fracking had to be considered included in the definition of “subterranean introduction,” and therefore subject
to regulation. Despite this decision, in 2005, Congress amended Section
300(d) of the SDWA in order to specifically exclude fracking. For an overview
of the connection between the Safe Drinking Water Act and fracking, see
Keith B. Hall, Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing Under the Safe Drinking
Water Act, 19 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2012); Holly A. Vandrovee, The Fight Over
Fracking: Recent Hydraulic Fracturing Litigation in Texas, 74 TEX. B.J. 390,
391 (2011).
172. This differentiated approach is clear in the recovery and disposal of
fracturing fluid. For example, New York chose to endorse the precautionary
principle, while Ohio and West Virginia adopted a non-intervention policy,
and are promoting shale gas development and exploitation through a minimal regulation. See generally, e.g., Hannah Wiseman, (presented 2012,
March). State and Local Regulation of Shale Oil and Gas Development: Adaptation, Experimentation, or Chaos? Presentation at Conference on Federalism and Energy in the United States, Searle Center, Northwestern University Law School, Chicago, IL. (National). Here, it is useful to refer to the fundamental aspects of the precautionary principle. This principle has been developed first in the environmental policy area. Already the Ministerial Declaration of the Second International Conference on the Protection of the North
Sea (1987) states: “in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging
effects of the most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which may require action to control inputs of such substances even before a causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific evidence.” Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea,
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proach from state to state is desirable, especially for the regulation of environmental matters.173
Ministerial
Declaration
(1987),
http://www.vliz.be/imisdocs/publications/140155.pdf. Later, during the Third
International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea (1990), a new
Ministerial Declaration clarified the previous one: “Participating governments will continue to apply the precautionary principle, that is to take action to avoid potentially damaging impacts of substances that are persistent,
toxic and liable to bioaccumulate even where there is no scientific evidence to
prove a causal link between emissions and effects.” Third International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, Ministerial Declaration (1990),
www.vliz.be/imisdocs/publications/140228.pdf. Finally, the principle has been
specifically legitimized in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration: “In order to
protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied
by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I)
(Aug. 12, 1992). The principle was later recalled in similar terms in the Preamble of the Convention on Biodiversity (1992), in Article 3 (Principles) of the
Convention on Climate Change (1992), and in the Paris Convention for the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (September
1992). The principles that should inspire recourse to the precautionary principle are the following: (i) implementation of the principle should be founded
on the most complete scientific assessment possible, which determines at
every moment the degree of scientific uncertainty; (ii) any decision on whether to act under the precautionary principle should be preceded by an assessment of the risk and of the potential consequences of not acting; and (iii) as
soon as the results of the scientific assessments and/or of the risk assessment
are available, all the stakeholders should have the chance to participate in
the evaluation of the various foreseeable actions with the greatest possible
transparency. See Giovanni Cordini, Paolo Cordini, Paolo Fois, Sergio
Marchisio, Diritto Ambientale. Profili internazionali europei e comparati (2d
ed. Giappichelli, 2008); Mariachiara Alberton, La quantificazione e la
riparazione del danno ambientale nel diritto internazionale e dell’Unione
Europea (Giuffrè, 2008).
173. Schauwecker reaffirms that the EPA has the duty, pursuant to the
Water Use Efficiency and Conservation Research Act of 2009 (H.R. 631
(111th)), to manage the risks linked to fracking, as this legislation “imposes
on the US Environmental Protection Agency the drafting of a research and
development programme that fosters water efficiency and conservation.”
Schauwecker, supra note 111, at 47. Deweese affirms that by far state regulation has proved to be ready and effective, and that the Congress’ efforts to
connect fracking to the SDWA will only hold back further industrial development of this fundamental resource. See generally Dewesee, supra note 118.
See also Cameron Jefferies, Unconventional Bridges Over Troubled Water:
Lessons to Be Learned from the Canadian Oil Sands as the United States
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A. Pricing and Fiscal Regime
In 1978, the United States implemented the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA),174 which entailed gradual removal of price controls and supplied economic subsidies for the development of
new natural gas sources, including for gas obtained from unconventional sources. Previously, the maximum price for interstate natural gas was set at a level that was artificially lower
than the equilibrium price that would have arisen from free
competition in the marketplace.175 This rate regulation produced an increase in demand and a tightening in supply, with
consequent repercussions on natural gas stocks and on production.176 Moreover, the NGPA contained advantageous condiMoves to Develop the Natural Gas of the Marcellus Shale Play, 33 ENERGY
L.J. 75 (2012).
174. Natural Gas Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (2015). On this matter, see
generally Richard Greer Morgan & Martha Priddy Patterson, Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978: Four Years of Practice and Two Years to Make Perfect,
The, 71 KY. L.J. 105 (1982); Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 355 (1990); Rodney L. Brown, Jr.,
Legislative History of the Natural Gas Policy Act: Title I, 59 TEX. L. REV. 101
(1980).
175. See generally Kevin L. Ward, Preemption Survives Deregulation of
Natural Gas: Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil and Gas
Board of Mississippi, 22 TULSA L. J. 639 (1986).
176. After the oil embargo in 1973 and the following “energy crisis” in 1979,
the U.S. government fostered a large number of projects, including the
strengthening and expansion of research and development projects linked to
energy sources, which were later salvaged with the creation of the DOE, and
to which has been given the task of identifying and best defining the respective responsibilities and competences of all federal energy plans and research
and development plans. It should be noted that the first oil crisis, coinciding
with the embargo put into effect by the Arab countries in 1973, resulted from
the hostilities that arose between Arab countries and Israel during the Yom
Kippur War, the fourth and last of the Israeli-Arab conflicts. In fact, for the
first time in history, an oil-exporting country decided to use oil as a real
weapon of war. Oil prices increased by 70 percent, reaching $5.11 per barrel.
In addition to the price increase, an embargo was announced, and production
fell by 5 percent in the first month, continuing with equal reductions during
each month following. The embargo against the United States was total, as a
reaction to the support it gave to Israel. The second oil crisis resulting from
the Iranian revolution, took place between 1978 and 1979. Iran stopped its
production, and the consequent oil shortage, which at first was balanced by a
production increase by other Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members, started to be widely felt, as Iran was globally the second largest oil-producing country. Petroleum History of Events 1970-2000,
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
(May
2002),
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tions for unconventional gas also in light of the very high extraction costs involved.177 This partial natural gas price deregulation constituted a critical advantage for the development of
these natural resources.
Turning to natural gas tariff regulation in China, the lack of
a national agency responsible for pricing creates uncertainties
in potential investors. The Chinese pricing regime for natural
gas is a mosaic of different market and administered prices, set
according to a number of factors.178 The Twelfth Five-Year Plan
(2011–2015) foresees a doubling of the output of gas-fired power
plants and an increase in the consumption of natural gas by
households.179 This is the reason the price of natural gas is kept at
an artificially depressed level that is lower than the international
market price. The consequent gap with domestic prices forces Chinese firms to import gas at a loss, significantly reducing the potential relevance of natural gas. The current government intervention and monopoly energy prices neither reflect the scarcity of
resources nor demand in the market. Furthermore, price distortions are not conducive to the effectiveness of market mechanisms and the allocation of resources, since energy prices are
detached from the market, which forces the government to subsidize certain energy industries, worsening the financial burden.180 Today, China’s gas pricing is a cost-plus regime that is
disciplined throughout the entire value chain.181 It has undergone some changes as the economy moves towards a markethttp://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/analysis_publications/chronology/pe
troleumchronology2000.htm.
177. 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (1978).
178. For a comparative analysis of the U.S. gas-pricing regime, see Boriss
Siliverstovs et al., International Market Integration for Natural Gas? A Cointegration Analysis of Prices in Europe, North America and Japan, 27 ENERGY
ECON. 603 (2005).
179. National People Congress of China, Twelfth Five-Year Plan (20112015), (March 2011), http://www.britishchamber.cn/content/chinas-twelfthfive-year-plan-2011-2015-full-english-version.
180. Id. Zhu Yi, Zhongguo Nengyuan Shichang Xianzhuang Fenxi: Jianlun
Zhongguo Nengyuan Shichang Guojihua [Chinese Situation of Energy Market: Discussion on the Internationalization of China’s Energy Market], 8
ZHEJIANG JINGJI [ZHEJIANG ECON.] 17 (2004).
181. Cost-plus pricing entails that, in accordance with the value chain, the
pricing formation flows from the price set by the government for the upstream producer to the midstream pipeline operator and then to the end user.
YI CHEN, DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES OF THE CHINESE NATURAL GAS MARKET 19
(2013).
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based economy. In spite of this, it essentially follows a fixedprice model, and a market-based pricing mechanism has yet to
be developed.
As a result, price and regulatory reform are much needed. Experimental price mechanisms have already been implemented,
starting in December 2011, in the province of Guangdong and
in the Guangxi region, where gas prices are no longer kept artificially lower than the market price levels, but are instead connected to the market price of fuel oil and liquefied petroleum
gas imported to Shanghai, which is a Chinese hub for gas trading and consumption.182 This trial reform overhauls the old
pricing formation and moves toward an oil-indexation mechanism. The final objective is to liberalize the wellhead price and
establish a market-based pricing regime. It will rely on the
concept of oil indexation to determine the gas price. By connecting the price of domestic natural gas with the international
price of its competing fuel, the oil-indexed price formula will
mirror international market fundamentals and demand. Eventually the wellhead price will no longer be subject to government-administered price, but will be set on a market basis.183
The cost-plus regime does not provide the fundamental price
signal that a market economy requires. A clear price signal is
essential to reflect the market value of natural resources, to
indicate the market trend, and to guide investment decisions.
The low domestic price creates disincentives to upstream companies from investing in Exploration and Production, thus hindering the development of conventional and unconventional
reserves.184 Furthermore, the current Chinese shale gas explo182. OXFORD INST. FOR ENERGY STUD., THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE GAS
PRICING: DRIVERS, CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMAND 9 (Registered
Charity
No.
286084,
2014)
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/NG-89.pdf.
183. Id. at 22–24.
184. Id. at 22. Preferential pricing has already been adopted in other unconventional gas resources that present higher extraction costs as compared
to conventional resources. These regimes could reasonably be extended to
shale gas production. The government has implemented several preferential
policies to support coalbed methane and coalmine methane extraction and
commercialization. CHINA GREENTECH INITIATIVE, UNCONVENTIONAL GAS IN
CHINA
8
(2011),
http://www.chinagoabroad.com/sites/v2/files/v1_attachments/2012/04/CGTI20
11-CCE-WS1-Unconventional-Gas.pdf. Other policies include exemption from
corporate tax for the first two years of production and a reduction of 50 per-
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ration and exploitation framework should also be improved in
relation to the tax system, which is a critical element in investment development and in the fostering of efficient resource
use.
The current Chinese shale gas regulatory framework should
be enhanced in two particular sectors, namely the fiscal and
pricing regimes, which are key elements in fostering needed
investments and promoting efficient use of resources. Under
China’s production-sharing contracts, international energy
companies must share a percentage of their profits with the
government or government-owned companies, in addition to
paying corporate taxes on gains.185 This creates a deterrent for
overseas investors to invest in high-risk activity such as shale
gas exploration and production. Conversely, the U.S. regulatory
regime, based on royalties, requires energy firms to pay merely
a portion of project revenues and corporate taxes on gains.
Other factors were also important in U.S. shale gas development. First, in the 2000s, natural gas prices were particularly
high.186 This allowed companies to realize significant profit
margins from drilling shale gas wells. The prospect of high
profit margins pushed existing energy enterprises and new entrants to invest heavily in shale gas fields, which eventually
pushed down natural gas prices.187
B. Barriers to Entry and Consequences on Competition in the
Gas Market
The barriers to entry for small and large firms into the American shale gas industry were much lower than in China as individual companies were able to lease or acquire land to explore. They were only required to submit paperwork to the
state government.

cent for the following three years, exemption from mining-rights fees, royalty
fees, value‐added tax (VAT), and feed‐in‐tariffs for coalbed methane and
coalmine methane‐fired power. Id.
185. See generally Erica Downs, Who’s Afraid of China’s National Oil Companies?, in ENERGY SECURITY: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, STRATEGIES AND
IMPLICATIONS (2010).
186. Zhongmin Wang & Alan Krupnick, US Shale Gas Development What
Led to the Boom?, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, May 2013, at 10,
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-IB-13-04.pdf
187. Id.
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The North American market structure also played a decisive
role in development of the shale gas industry, which is undoubtedly one of the most capital-intensive industries. It follows that small natural gas firms do not have the financial capacity and technical know-how to make substantial venture
investments in technology. Indeed, in the United States it was
large, independent natural gas firms that significantly invested
in the early stage of shale gas development. Conversely, the
major oil firms, although having the capacity, considered shale
gas less appealing as an investment than conventional oil and
gas. The capital market’s role was fundamental in this context,
and contributed to pushing the shale gas boom forward by
providing natural gas firms with copious capital to drill, and it
also eased many transactions in which larger oil and gas enterprises bought out smaller firms committed to shale gas drilling.188
In China, however, the central government exerts power
firmly on shale gas blocks by organizing auctions or granting
exploration rights.189 This scheme creates various barriers to
entry for both small and large overseas firms into the domestic
shale gas industry,190 because in order to take part in auctions,
firms had to be either Chinese or Chinese-held joint-venture
companies, and they needed to have an extremely elevated
minimum value.191 In particular, the approval system for for-

188. Id. at 11.
189. Id. at 10.
190. In the first auction, held in June 2011, only state-owned companies
were admitted to compete. This auction stimulated a feeble response, as only six companies put in bids for four blocks, and only two blocks were eventually awarded. A second auction was organized in October 2012, collecting 152
bids for twenty blocks. CSIS, China Awards More Shale Gas Blocks Although
Much Remains to be Seen (Jan. 23, 2013), http://csis.org/publication/chinaawards-more-shale-gas-blocks-although-much-remains-be-seen.
191. Enterprises are required to invest at least RMB 30,000 ($4747 USD)
per square meter annually, three times the minimum amount for crude oil
exploration. Additionally, the second shale gas tender, launched in 2012, required bidding companies to have 300 million yuan ($47.4 million USD) in
registered capital. Ministry of Land & Res. of the People’s Republic of China,
Shale Gas Tender Submission Announcement, RFFF.ORG (May 17, 2012),
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-IB-13-04.pdf
(in Chinese). While a high market entry threshold may defeat China’s goal of
attracting diversified investment and fostering competition, this practice may
lessen environmental risks, as in China small and medium-sized companies
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eign investments in the mineral industry, embracing any underground activities, is subject to both foreign capital and industry access approval mechanisms.192 The former implies a
multitiered administrative approval system according to which
authorities of different levels exercise different powers over different industrial categories and total investment amounts. As
for industry access, China enforces an authorization scheme for
the exploration and exploitation of underground natural resources. Specifically, the investor must apply for registration,
hold an exploitation or exploration license, and gain the right of
exploration and exploitation.193
As one might expect, such a burdensome policy for foreign investments in the Chinese mineral industry is far from conducive to shale gas production. Joint ventures between domestic
and foreign companies through both inbound and outbound investments for extraction technology and potentially for infrastructure development seem to be the best strategy in this early stage of the shale gas industry. Obviously, Chinese restrictions on foreign investments constitute a relevant barrier.
As explained above, prior to January 30, 2012, exploration and
exploitation of shale gas in China could only be carried out by
Chinese state-owned companies. However, according to the revised Foreign Investment Industry Guidance Catalog, shale
gas foreign investments are included in the “encouraged” category of the catalog, allowing foreign investors to form with
their Chinese partners Sino-foreign joint ventures and Sinoforeign contractual (cooperative) joint ventures.194 Additionally,
an MLR Circular issued on October 26, 2012, reaffirms that
private Chinese oil companies may also explore for and exploit
shale gas, including by way of creating joint ventures with foreign companies. The regulations do not specify a maximum
are more difficult to regulate and have less financial and technical ability to
adopt best practices. See Enoe et al., supra note 22.
192. CHINESE ACAD. OF LAND & RES. ECON., DEP’T OF SCI. & TECH. & INT’L
COOPERATION OF THE MINISTRY OF LAND & RES., A GUIDE TO INVESTMENT IN
CHINA’S
MINERAL
INDUSTRY
13
(2012),
http://www.chinaminingtj.org/en/document/A_Guide_to_Investment_in_Chin
a’s_Mineral_Industry(2012).pdf.
193. See generally id.
194. See Catalogue of Encouraged Foreign Investment Industries, MINISTRY
COMM. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC CHINA II(6), II(9) (Feb. 21, 2012), translation at
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/aaa/201203/2012030802783
7.shtml.

638

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 41:2

percentage equity shareholding that a foreign company is permitted to hold in such a joint venture; however the MLR’s public bidding invitation terms require that the Chinese party
must have a majority ownership.195 Furthermore, investors will
likely wait to see what shale gas-pricing policies and government support mechanisms are put in place before actually investing in Chinese shale gas, as uncertainty and regulatory
changes might have detrimental effects on them.196
In this context, it should be pointed out that the absence of
competition in the energy market generates an unfair allocation of resources. In fact, in 2001, China joined the World
Trade Organization (WTO), and consequently must increase
competitiveness of state-owned energy companies while restraining national control over energy companies.197 At the
moment, there is no actual competition between the three major Chinese oil companies, as they have the same, single shareholder, i.e., the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (“SASAC”). Indeed,
there is no competition in either the upstream or downstream
energy sectors, as they feature market monopolies and administrative price guides,198 regardless of the fact that both the
Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) and the 2012 Energy
195. Dina Yin, Zhao Yan, Shale Gas and CBM Companies to Pay VAT,
CHINA
L.
INSIGHT
(June
28,
2013),
http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2013/06/articles/fdi/shale-gas-and-cbmcompanies-to-pay-vat/.
196. See KPMG GLOB. ENERGY INST., supra note 51, at 11.
197. As a condition for joining the WTO, China agreed to reduce tariffs on
all imported goods and open its markets to foreign investors. In return, China
has benefitted from the Most Favored Nation treatment and reciprocal rights
for trade and investment. See Farah, supra note 82. In addition, China
agreed on the establishment and enforcement of a stronger intellectual property rights regime. Paolo Farah & Elena Cima, China’s Participation in the
World Trade Organization: Trade in Goods, Services, Intellectual Property
Rights and Transparency Issues, in EL COMERCIO CON CHINA. OPORTUNIDADES
EMPRESARIALES, INCERTIDUMBRES JURÍDICAS 83, 100–01 (Aurelio LopezTarruella Martinez ed., 2010).
198. In practice, CNPC, the Sinopec Group, and CNOOC possess the absolute majority of the exploration blocks, despite the fact that the 1998 Mineral
Resources Exploration Block Regulation stipulates that 25,000 unit blocks
are the maximum features in exploration projects of oil and gas. See generally, Chen Shou Hai, Woguo Tianranqi Chanye de Longduan Ji Falv Guizhi
[Legal Regulation of Monopoly in China’s Natural Gas Industry] in
NENGYUAN YANJIU BAOGAO [ENERGY L. RES. REP.] 336 (2012).
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White Paper call for the introduction of private-capital and
market mechanisms, which would terminate the current energy monopoly that exacerbates lack of supervision and inefficiency.199 The only way China could improve its future energy
policy is by converting nonmarket mechanisms to market
mechanisms, adopting a modern corporate system for energy
companies, and changing the government management system
from strict controls to limited supervision.200
Another aspect that has certainly advanced the growth in
shale gas development in the United States is its distinctive
market structure for gas transportation. In particular, “ownership of transportation capacity rights is unbundled from ownership of the pipeline itself.”201 This makes it possible for many
of the small producers that first ventured into shale to access
the market through a competitive bid for pipeline capacity.
This is an inherent problem affecting market access in China,
where pipeline capacity is bundled to facility ownership, and
large incumbent state-owned enterprises dominate the entire
transportation infrastructure.
C. Mineral Rights Ownership Regulation
Another fundamental element of the present comparative
analysis is the land and mineral rights ownership regime. In
the United States, shale gas development has taken place
mainly on private land.202 Private land ownership allowed natural gas firms a way to ensure reasonable returns from their
early investments in technology innovations through acquiring
land, proving its potential, and then selling it. Private mineral
199. The National Energy 12th Five-Year Plan calls for a reform of energy
mix, advocates for a rationalization of energy-pricing mechanisms to encourage private capital to invest in the field of energy, fosters the granting of propriety to encourage technological progress, and to progress in the innovation
of scientific and technical equipment. In the same vein, the 2012 Energy
White Paper promotes a sustainable use of energy through the establishment
of a market mechanism in energy pricing, and the creation of interconnected
institutional mechanisms. Text in English of the Energy and Climate Goals
of China’s 12th Five-Year Plan http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/energyclimate-goals-china-twelfth-five-year-plan.pdf
200. NI JIAN MING, GUOJIA NENGYUAN ANQUAN BAOGAO [NATIONAL ENERGY
SECURITY REPORT] 329–30 (2005).
201. KENNETH B. MEDLOCK ET AL., SHALE GAS AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
14 (2011).
202. Wang & Krupnick, supra note 186.
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rights ownership creates a constituency favoring drilling and
helps restrain the temptation of governments to raise revenues
through shale gas drilling.203 China has auctioned off drilling
blocks, and has required a certain minimum investment to develop auctioned blocks within a certain period of time.204 In
theory, this should force firms to drill but it is not clear whether this mechanism would offer a sufficient incentive to innovate. On the other hand, private land ownership carries the
risk that some speculating energy companies may rent large
areas of land without making appropriate investments. In China, below-ground mineral rights are owned by the state. State
ownership can back operators piecing together contiguous
blocks of land, achieving a more efficient and unhindered exploitation of a gas field. Moreover, the government can lease
the drilling rights at below-market rates if it wishes to.
A further element to be analyzed is the legal regime concerning water-rights regulation in the United States.205 A mineral
lease to a shale gas operator generally comprises the details of
what consumption the operator can make of water on the surface of the property, and the specific lease terms will govern
the relationship between the surface fee owner and mineral
rights holder.206 Customarily, these contracts allow water to be
employed for operating on the premises and the owner or operator can use a reasonable quantity of water so long as other ri203. Id. at 10.
204. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., China: International Energy Data and Analysis,
at
20
(May
14,
2015),
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Chin
a/china.pdf.
205. The water rights regulation in the United States is derived from the
English “riparian” rights regime. Accordingly, landowners adjacent to waterways gain water rights to that waterway as an appurtenant feature of land
ownership. The specific rights that landowners gain depend on the type of
water in question. The rights are designed to address the following water
resources: (i) “diffused surface water” (such as rainwater); (ii) traditional
stream, river and lake surface water; (iii) groundwater that flows in “welldefined subterranean streams”; and (iv) “percolating groundwater.” For an
overview on this point, see R. Timothy Weston, Harmonizing Management of
Ground and Surface Water Use Under Eastern Water Law Regimes, 11 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 239 (2007-2008).
206. Cameron Jefferies, Unconventional Bridges Over Troubled Water - Lessons to be Learned from the Canadian Oil Sands as the United States Moves
to Develop the Natural Gas of the Marcellus Shale Play, 33 ENERGY L.J. 75,
100 (2012).
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parian rights holders are not prejudiced in their use.207 In fact,
the reasonable use doctrine renders “virtually all uses of water
made upon the land from which it is extracted . . . ‘reasonable,’
even if they more or less deplete the supply to the harm of
neighbors, unless the purpose is malicious or the water is simply wasted.”208 Some states comprising the Marcellus Shale,
namely New York and Ohio, have implemented a “regulated
riparian” pattern to deal with these unclear provisions.209 Conversely, Pennsylvania and West Virginia depend heavily on
common law regulatory precedents, and have yet to pass permitting procedures.210
D. Pipeline Network
Moreover, in the United States, an extensive and sophisticated network of natural gas pipelines existed before shale gas became a major gas resource. Fundamental in this context was
the policy of open access to interstate natural gas pipelines (as
well as storage facilities) resulting from a series of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders in the 1980s and
early 1990s.211 In the following years, significant technological
advances enabled a surge in investment in the production of
shale gas, which determined a surge in supply coupled with
strong demand driven by sustainable low natural gas prices. 212
This constituted an exciting opportunity for energy infrastructure providers. Today, infrastructure investors benefit from attractive opportunities, relatively stable low-risk cash flows underpinned by long-term contracts, and growth perspectives
stemming from the need for expanded pipeline capacity. This
scenario has increased the potential for attractive returns and
represents a crucial case for investment in energy infrastruc207. Id. at 100.
208. Id. at 250.
209. Id. at 255.
210. Id. at 250–59.
211. See in particular, FERC 1985 Order No. 436, the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act (NGWDA) passed by Congress in 1989, and FERC 1992
Order No. 636. See also Richard J. Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REV. 345
(1983).
212. See generally Dan Alger & Michael Toman, Market-Based Regulation
of Natural Gas Pipelines, 2.3 J. REG. ECON. 263 (1990); Harry G. Broadman &
Joseph P. Kalt, How Natural Is Monopoly? The Case of Bypass in Natural
Gas Distribution Markets, 6 YALE J. REG. 181, 184 (1989).

642

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 41:2

ture across the gas supply chain. In the United States, investors rely on provisions of pipeline infrastructure that are generally predicated on stable, fee-based revenues, largely insulated from direct commodity price exposure. Additionally, more
than half of the top midstream pipeline enterprises have
adopted a “master-limited partnership” structure as an effective alternative to a corporate structure.213 This partnership
model does not pay corporate tax, which has contributed to
promoting investment in the shale gas industry.214
Although China has a considerable reserve estimate, the development of shale gas as a key element of the country’s energy
mix may be undermined by the lack of adequate physical infrastructure, mainly gas pipelines for transport and delivery.
Large-scale pipelines will have to be built to manage the capacity of targeted output and to transport the product from the
major gas fields, which could be challenging for smaller exploration and production firms.215 In particular, there is no integrated national gas grid, and most of China’s infrastructures
were constructed to transport its most important fuel, coal.216
Currently all principal gas transmission lines are owned by the
state,217 and a number of new pipelines are needed. Developing
transportation and storage facilities is crucial for shale gas expansion, and even though much still needs to be done, China
213. Maquarie Inv. Mgmt., US Shale Gas: A Good News Pipeline 2 (2012),
https://www.macquarie.com.au/dafiles/Internet/mgl/au/mfg/mim/docs/miminsight/mim-insight-apr12-shalegas.pdf?v=1; Conoco Eyeing Chinese Shale
Despite Block Exits, ENERGY CHINA FORUM (May 28, 2015),
http://www.shalegaschinasummit.com/News_Show.asp?pid=9156.
214. Id.
215. See KPMG GLOB. ENERGY INST., supra note 51, at 10.
216. 45 percent of domestic railway capacity is devoted to coal transport. On
the coal sector in China, see Mou Dunguo & Zhi Li, A Spatial Analysis of
China’s Coal Flow, 48 ENERGY POL’Y 358 (2012); Richard Heinberg & David
Fridley, The End of Cheap Coal, 468 NATURE 367–69 (2010); Wang Bing, An
Imbalanced Development of Coal and Electricity Industries in China, 35
ENERGY POL’Y 4959 (2007); Lin Bo-qiang & Jiang-hua Liu, Estimating Coal
Production Peak and Trends of Coal Imports in China, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 512
(2010).
217. Currently, CNPC essentially monopolizes pipeline construction and operations in China. It owns and operates 90 percent of pipelines. Whether
CNPC would allow for shale gas transport by the third-party through their
pipelines still need to be seen, since it has no legal obligation to do so. See GuoHua Shi et al., Development Status of Liquefied Natural Gas Industry in China, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 7457 (2010).
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plans to build 14,400 miles of new gas pipelines between 2010
and 2016 to reinforce the current 21,000-mile network.218 In
addition, China will need to construct or reinforce infrastructures that can safely dispose of the contaminated material used
to fracture the shale rock, and thus protect the environment.
Energy expert Diana Ngo stresses that these factors are important because they will reduce costs caused by environmental
damage occurring in the future.219 Additionally, these precautionary steps will also help China exponentially speed up its
well-development timeline (for instance, PetroChina took a
lengthy period of eleven months to complete the country’s first
horizontal well).220
E. The Politics of Shale: Grounds for International Cooperation
Shale gas development has deeply modified the energy scenario in the United States from a status of shortage to that of
plenty. Already the world’s biggest energy consumer, the United States may soon become the largest producer of hydrocarbons.221 As a consequence of the shale gas revolution, North
218. On January 23, 2013, the State Council issued the notice of the Energy
12th Five-Year Plan stressing that, due to the instability of marine energy
transportation, China will develop on-shore pipeline constructions for oil and
gas transportation, which should reduce energy supply security threats. Enhancing transportation and storage facilities would help to expand shale gas
development. Furthermore, some parts of the shale gas rich provinces have
existing pipeline networks, but small-scale LNG and compressed natural gas
technologies may be necessary to boost the early stage of shale gas development in China. At the moment, the 4200-km West-East Pipeline links the
Tarim and Ordos Basins to markets in the Shanghai area. The second WestEast Pipeline was completed in June 2011, although several sub-lines remain
to be completed. A recently completed 1700-km gas pipeline carries Sichuan
Province gas to Hubei, Anhui, Jiangxi, Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces, and
Shanghai. JANE NAKANO, DAVID PUMPHREY, ROBERT PRICE, JR. & MOLLY A.
WATSON, PROSPECTS FOR SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA EXAMINING
POTENTIALS AND CHALLENGES IN CHINA AND INDIA 7, 19 (2012),
http://csis.org/files/publication/120911_Nakano_ProspectsShaleGas_Web.pdf.
219. Diana Ngo, 3 Reasons Why Shale Gas is a Pipe Dream in China- Part I,
ENERGY IN ASIA (May 11, 2012), http://energyinasiablog.com/2012/05/; Diana
Ngo, Why China Lags Behind the U.S. in Shale Gas Development, ENERGY IN
ASIA (Jan. 15, 2013), http://energyinasiablog.com/2013/01/15/why-china-lagsbehind-us-shale-gas-development/.
220. Id.
221. Much of the credit for the technological advancements that made shale
gas development possible are owed to the members of the Mitchell Energy
shale gas team, in particular to the late George Mitchell (1919–2013), who
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America’s natural gas base, now estimated at 3400 trillion cubic feet, could provide for current levels of consumption for over
one-hundred years.222 Shale gas, replacing oil as the principal
agent of a new global energy equilibrium, is already transforming global energy relations, and the impact will be more evident when gas exports begin (the first LNG exports are expected to start around 2017).223 There are several LNG terminals located in the United States, originally constructed to import gas, which are now looking to start exporting possibly to
Europe, India, and China, as a way to extend their sphere of
influence while reducing the dominance of the Middle East and
Russia in the gas sector. The shale gas revolution has modified
the economics of oil and gas production in the United States,
reducing dependence on imported oil and gas supplies and reinforcing domestic manufacturing through lower energy costs.
Over the last decade, the political attitude towards shale gas
has been changing, and more consideration is given to concerns
regarding shale’s potential detrimental effects on the environment, and in particular water sources. Accordingly, the Obama
administration plans to enforce more stringent controls over
drillers by forcing them to seize emissions of determined air
pollutants from new wells beginning in 2015.224 The rapid deworked to refine shale technologies despite harsh criticism, especially in the
Barnett shale formation of northern Texas. Hydraulic fracturing has been so
successful that energy experts have called this the “most significant energy
innovation so far of this century.” Mary Lashley Barcella & David Hobbs,
Fueling North America’s Energy Future, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2010, at A10;
see also The Good News About Gas- The Natural Gas Revolution and its Consequences, supra note 166; The US Natural-Gas Boom Will Transform the
World, supra note 166.
222. See Yergin, supra note 26, at 332.
223. Keith Johnson & Ben Lefebvre, U.S. Approves Expanded Gas Exports,
WALL
ST.
J.
(May
18,
2013,
11:18
AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324767004578489130300876
450.
224. In President Barack Obama’s March 30, 2011, energy proposal, he indicated that shale gas could play a large role in U.S. energy policy, particularly with mitigation of its environmental impacts:
Recent technology and operational improvements in extracting natural gas resources, particularly shale gas, have increased gas drilling
activities nationally and led to significantly higher natural gas production estimates for decades to come. The Administration is taking
steps to address these [environmental] concerns and ensure that
natural gas production proceeds in a safe and responsible manner.
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velopment of shale gas in the United States has nevertheless
stoked environmental controversy and debate. The suitability
of taking the U.S. regulatory framework as a model scheme
remains debatable because the United States is experiencing
difficulties with environmental aspects related to shale gas extraction,225 in particular given the complex barriers that developing countries such as China are facing in this sector. Nevertheless, it is likely that a comparative analysis might contribute to resolving some of these issues.
Large-scale production of shale gas in the United States is already transforming worldwide dynamics of the gas industry.
The rapid growth of this new resource created a global surplus
of LNG, whose rapid buildup coincided with the emergence of
shale gas as a new supply source.226 Until 2010, the United
States was supposed to be the greatest LNG market due to a
projected domestic shortfall. Conversely, shale gas increase
may transform the United States into an LNG exporter, leaving much LNG in search of a market that will be only partially
absorbed by growing Asia. This over-supply of LNG fostered
wider competition among gas suppliers and reduced prices. It is
also modifying the economic and political equilibrium stemming from a new, wider geopolitical impact of the global gas
market, which is engendering new gas competition.227 As shale
gas expands globally, we should assess the possible consequences of price development in relation to the potential establishment of an Organization of Gas Exporting Countries
(OGEC), stemming from the Gas Exporting Countries Forum
(GECF), a gas-exporting countries forum with headquarters in
Doha, Qatar (which is the main gas supplier to Europe, after

White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President on
America’s Energy Security, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 30, 2011, 11:36 AM),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/30/remarks-presidentamericas-energy-security. See generally Jody Freeman, Climate and Energy
Policy in the Obama Administration, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 375 (2012).
225. See Reeder, supra note 130 (describing the complex legal obstacles inherent to shale gas development).
226. In the United States, the surplus of domestic gas production is partly
due to the mismatches between LNG project start-ups and the completion of
LNG tanker construction combined with the expiry of charter agreements for
older tankers as a result of production declines in older projects. See STEVENS,
supra note 17, at 21.
227. See Yergin, supra note 26, at 335.
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Russia).228 In particular, if gas prices further lower reducing
exporters’ revenues, this would constitute an incentive for an
OGEC to take the lead and defend falling prices.229 It remains
to be seen to what extent the GECF will develop into an OGEC.
It is not clear how such a cartel would fix the gas price, possibly enacting price-fixing mechanisms or imposing production
quantitative restrictions. In reality, traded gas is often subject
to long-term contracts that feature rigid pricing terms supported by international commercial provisions. As one might expect, government interference in pricing terms would amount
to a breach of such agreements, triggering international arbitration in order to settle the contractual dispute.
On a different level, U.S. President Barack Obama and former Chinese General Secretary Hu Jintao acknowledged the
importance of fostering cooperation in shale gas development
by establishing an agreement in the form of the Global Shale
Gas Resource Initiative (GSGI) in November 2009. This agreement provides U.S. assistance to assess, develop, and promote
investment in shale gas reserves, and to help develop operational best practices and effective environmental safeguards.230
The goal of the GSGI is to assist countries seeking to develop
their own unconventional gas resources while balancing energy
security and environmental concerns.231 So far, partnerships
have been arranged with India, Poland, and China. Chinese
state-owned gas producers have entered into major transactions with large international players to develop shale gas reserves in China and to exploit shale gas reserves in Western
Canada and the United States.232

228. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, KEY WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS 13 (2015),
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/key-worldenergy-statistics-2015.html.
229. See STEVENS, supra note 17, at 23 (remarking that this was precisely
the mechanism that led to the creation of OPEC in 1960); Farah & Cima,
supra note 19.
230. See Melanie Hart & Daniel J. Weiss, Making Fracking Safe in the East
and West, Environmental Safeguards on Shale Gas Production Needed as
China Begins Development, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 21, 2011),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2011/10/21/10407/maki
ng-fracking-safe-in-the-east-and-west/.
231. David L. Goldwyn, Briefing on the Global Shale Gas Initiative Conference (Aug. 24, 2010), http://m.state.gov/md146249.htm.
232. See KPMG GLOB. ENERGY INST., supra note 51, at 11.
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Whether the GSGI can provide a regulatory model to develop
unconventional natural gas resources in an environmentally
sensitive manner remains to be seen. In that respect, appropriateness of the U.S. legal framework as a model scheme is still
debatable, given the problem that shale gas is creating in the
United States, especially in relation to the environment. While
good progress on the exploration and development aspects of
this agreement has been made, environmental cooperation is
still lacking. This is in part due to the fact that the United
States is still struggling to design the most adequate domestic
regulatory framework for safeguards. Environmental protection is not the priority for either side, as they do not want to
jeopardize the potential of China’s shale gas by firmly pursuing
environmental protection. At the same time, U.S. energy companies engaged in these bilateral exploration and development
projects aimed at exchanging assessment and extraction technology for gaining Chinese commercial market access. On the
other side, China strives to transfer technology from the United
States, which often implies intellectual property rights concerns.233
Almost all fracking technology and experience are owned by
U.S. companies, and China needs to learn from them in order
to develop its own shale gas services and industry. To this end,
Chinese oil companies have already started investing in the
U.S. shale market. Namely, CNOOC has joined with Chesa-

233. Zhong mei ye yan qi he zuo: ge you suo tu [China-United States Shale
Gas Coopeation: Each Side Has its Own Plans, ZHONGGUO HUAGONG BAO
[CHINA
CHEMICAL
INDUSTRY
NEWS),
(June
8,
2010),
http://www.cheminfo.gov.cn/ZXZX/page_info.aspx?id=276022&Tname=hgyw
&c=10; Clifford M. Gross, The Growth of China’s Technology Transfer Industry Over the Next Decade: Implications for Global Markets, J. TECH.
TRANSFER 1 (2012); Arnaud De La Tour et al., Innovation and International
Technology Transfer: The Case of the Chinese Photovoltaic Industry, 39
ENERGY POL’Y 761 (2011); Bo Wang, Can CDM Bring Technology Transfer to
China?—An Empircal Study of Technology Transfer in China’s CDM Projects,
38 ENERGY POL’Y 2572 (2010); Bronwyn H. Hall & Christian Helmers, The
Role of Patent Protection in (Clean/Green) Technology Transfer (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w6323, 2010); David G. Ockwell et al.,
Intellectual Property Rights and Low Carbon Technology Transfer: Conflicting Discourses of Diffusion and Development, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 729
(2010); Rasmus Lema & Adrian Lema, Technology Transfer? The Rise of China and India in Green Technology Sectors, 2 INNOVATION & DEV. 23 (2012).
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peake Energy on production ventures,234 and Sinopec partnered
with Devon Energy in a similar deal.235 These agreements were
minority interests in actual gas production, and constituted investments to export fracking know-how and technologies
through participation in the exploration and production
team.236 However, the way China will overcome the technology
and experience barriers is still open to debate. U.S. techniques
are not very mature, and may fail to answer China’s know-how
needs. Also, Chinese shale gas is found in deeper reserves,
while shale gas in the United States is mostly distributed in
plains and hidden shallowly.237 The hidden depth and the peculiar geological context make China’s exploitation much more
challenging. Moreover, given that China’s ultimate goal is to
achieve and maintain energy security by developing its domestic natural resources, it cannot exclusively bid on U.S. technology and expertise. Accordingly, it will continue to invest in major foreign energy companies (as happened with Chesapeake
Energy and Devon Energy), and then it will import early models of hydraulic fracturing in order to develop its own domestic
234. Joe Carroll & Benjamin Haas, Sinopec’s U.S. Shale Deal Struck at
Two-Thirds’ Discount, BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK, (Feb. 26, 2013, 4:03 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-02-25/sinopec-to-buychesapeake-oil-and-gas-assets-for-1-02-billion.
235. Angel Gonzalez & Ryan Dezember, Sinopec Enters U.S. Shale, WALL
ST.
J.
(Jan.
4,
2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203550304577138493192325
500.
236. Chesapeake Energy concluded a deal that transferred 33 percent of its
license rights in the United States to CNOOC in exchange for Chinese financial support necessary to guarantee continued operations on the Chesapeakeowned sites. Energy expert Elias Hinckley underlines that the price of fracking technologies and extraction expertise is going to rise in the United States
as Chinese firms bid to take possession of the necessary technology and expertise to hasten their own shale gas revolution. Hinckley remarks:
How significant the technology and expertise price increases will be
remains to be seen, but the Chinese appetite, and the likely pace of
acquisition over the next few years will likely have a material impact
not just on service and technology, but also on the cost of production
here in the U.S.
Elias Hinckley, The Road to Chinese Shale Gas Goes Through the U.S.,
ENERGY
TRENDS
INSIDER
(Dec.
12,
2012),
http://www.energytrendsinsider.com/2012/12/12/the-road-to-chinese-shalegas-goes-through-the-u-s/.
237. Wang & Krupnick, supra note 186.
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model of fracking technology by reverse engineering the technology.238
U.S. companies have a strong interest in supporting bilateral
environmental protection efforts, as a shale gas environmental
accident in China would not only affect the Chinese economy,
but would also augment opposition to fracking in the United
States.239 Moreover, if China does not comply with best practices in capturing GHG, shale gas development will increase China’s emissions instead of reducing them. Further efforts are
needed to guarantee that China optimizes the advantages from
shale gas development, that is to say decreasing oil imports
and pollution, while reducing the environmental hazards.
Within U.S.-China bilateral cooperation on shale gas development, a collaborative dialogue has already commenced, engaging governments, NGOs, the private sector, researchers, and
academia. This exchange should be reinforced, and China
should focus on importing and developing environmentallyfriendly technologies, best practices, and a comprehensive
regulatory framework to foster safe and secure exploitation of
its shale gas resources.
V. THE PROSPECTS FOR SHALE GAS IN CHINA BETWEEN
REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS AND NEW GEOPOLITICAL
BALANCES
As shale gas radically impacts the supply and demand of the
world’s energy mix and market, new geopolitical factors must
be assessed, taking into account that, as far as China is con238. Historically, reverse engineering has been used by the Chinese in nuclear reactor technology, see Joe Mcdonald, China Sets Sights on New Global
Export:
Nuclear
Energy,
PHYS.ORG
(Aug.
24,
2016),
http://phys.org/news/2016-08-china-sights-global-export-nuclear.html#jCp
(“China's government-run nuclear industry is based on foreign technology but
has spent two decades developing its own with help from Westinghouse Electric Co., France's Areva and EDF and other partners.”).
239. As happened following the Fukushima nuclear meltdown in Japan,
which increased American and European opposition to nuclear power. Bettina B. F. Wittneben, The Impact of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident on European Energy Policy, 15 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 1 (2012); Howard L. Hall, Fukushima Daiichi: Implications for Carbon‐free Energy, Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Community Resilience, 7 INTEGRATED ENVTL. ASSESSMENT &
MGMT. 406 (2011). On Germany’s nuclear energy phaseout, see Jahn Detlef &
Sebastian Korolczuk, German Exceptionalism: The End of Nuclear Energy in
Germany!, 21(1) ENVTL. POL’Y 159 (2012).
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cerned, economic and demographic growth will increase pressure on global energy supplies, and thus all fuel sources will
have to be exploited.240 China has historically depended on fuel
imports from politically sensitive regions, restraining its foreign policy options.241 This predominant dependence on foreign
energy poses different risks: disruptions to its imported energy,
sustained and extremely volatile energy prices and a clash between China’s foreign policy interests and its overseas energy
interests.242 Copious shale gas production can help the country
acquire security of energy supply, which could lead to both a
dramatic and radical change in its relationships with other nations. The emergence of this new resource in North America is
already changing the dynamics of the global gas business and
energy geopolitics, demonstrating that the gas market is truly
global.243
Indeed, the energy market is currently affected by a surplus
of production. The principal cause of this surplus originates in
the mass production of shale gas from the United States, which
is now closer to the goal of energy independence. Energy demand cannot absorb this excess in resources produced, particularly as demand has decreased because of the current global
economic recession, especially in Europe. In other words, U.S.
investment in the industry of fracking is bearing fruit for which
240. Globally, the shale gas revolution will also have important geopolitical
consequences, for instance, reducing Europe’s overdependence on its two present dominant gas suppliers, Qatar and Russia. Marjolein de Ridder &
Sijbren de Jong, The “Game changer”: Geopolitical Implications of the ‘Shale
Gas
Revolution’
9
(2013),
http://www.atlcom.nl/upload/AP_6_2013_De_Ridder___De_Jong.pdf.
241. In light of the absence of a sustainable supply of conventional fossil
energy and excessively rapid growth of demand for energy, Chinese energy
external dependence is still high. On this point, Zha Daojiong points out the
relevance of energy efficiency measures, remarking that “Dependence on foreign sources of energy supply is in itself a threat to China’s energy security;
the key threat is the ever-growing consumption without significant improvement in energy efficiency.” Zha Daojiong, China’s Energy Security: Domestic
and International Issues, 48 SURVIVAL 179 (2006).
242. See Bo Kong, supra note 136.
243. Shale gas can be a strategic tool to deter a strengthening of the political risk the global oil market currently faces while reducing “U.S. and Chinese dependence on Middle East natural gas supplies, lowering the incentives for geopolitical and commercial competition between the two largest
consuming countries and providing both countries with new opportunities to
diversify their energy supply.” MEDLOCK, supra note 201, at 13.
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there is excess supply of oil and gas in a time in history when
the global economy is struggling to recover.244
The excess production has caused a collapse in oil prices and
natural gas, which has not, however, been followed by an effort
by Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
to cut production. International experts in the energy market
are trying to understand the reasons behind this strategy. One
hypothesis, which sees in the failure to cut production by
OPEC an attempt to exclude from the market competition of
U.S. shale gas, is far-fetched. Indeed, hydrocarbons extracted
from shale rock in the United States produce income at prices
between $40 and $115, implying that, if OPEC could keep
crude oil at $70 per barrel, competition of shale gas in the
United States would be strongly affected.245 Such a pricing
strategy would slow the development of the new generation of
western mining technologies that are slowly eroding the bargaining and geopolitical power of the members of OPEC.246 Protracted low prices would produce a financial return which
would defeat the costly investment required for starting the
production of shale gas and would create further instability.
From a different perspective, shale gas can be a strategic tool
to discourage the rise of the political risk that the global oil
market is facing, while reducing “dependence on the US and
Chinese natural gas reserves of the Middle East, limiting the
incentives for geopolitical competition and trade between the
two main consuming countries and providing both new opportunities to diversify their energy reserves.”247
244. See Leonardo Maugeri, Troppa offerta di greggio e non c’è il coraggio di
tagliare la produzione [Too Much Supply of Crude Oil and There is Not the
Courage
to
Cut
Production],
REPUBBLICA.IT
(Nov.
29,
2014),
http://www.repubblica.it/economia/2014/11/29/news/leonardo_maugeri_troppa
_offerta_di_greggio_e_non_c_il_coraggio_di_tagliare_la_produzione101702664/?refresh_ce.
245. On oil price data, see Arthur Berman, Why the Oil Price Collapse is
U.S. Shale’s Fault, OIL PRICE (Apr. 6, 2015, 10:08 PM),
http://oilprice.com/Energy/Oil-Prices/Why-The-Oil-Price-Collapse-Is-U.S.Shales-Fault.html.
246. In this vein, see Federico Fubini, Petrolio, tutti contro tutti così la
strategia saudita indebolisce Usa e Russia [Oil-for-All as the Saudi Strategy
Weakens the US and Russia], REPUBBLICA.IT (Nov. 29, 2014),
http://www.repubblica.it/economia/2014/11/29/news/petrolio_tutti_contro_tutt
i_cos_la_strategia_saudita_indebolisce_usa_e_russia-101679458/.
247. MEDLOCK, supra note 201, at 13.
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In the light of the analysis above, some essential elements of
potential Chinese shale gas development should be pointed out.
First, there is a need to design a comprehensive and conducive
regulatory environment, legally implemented, which would
take into consideration the environmental hazards related to
shale gas exploration and production. Shale gas production in
China is in its infancy, and a sound regulatory system is required to assure long-term exploitation. Overarching effective
unitary regulation would reduce uncertainty in the gas market
and foster future investments offering attractive terms to private investors.248 Second, China needs to tackle its unsatisfactory record of environmental enforcement which jeopardizes
the capacity of existing laws to prevent the downside of hydraulic fracturing. This can be accomplished through adoption
of transparency initiatives and mandatory disclosure of environmental information. This would also help reduce the friction
between Beijing’s concerns over energy security and opposition
by reluctant local communities worried about the environmental costs of shale gas exploration and extraction. Infrastructure
development and technology transfer are equally needed, and
the previous experience of the United States in this sector can
be of great help to the development of Chinese shale gas industry. As part of this strategy, China’s Ministry of Resources has
invited some major oil and gas companies to pitch for shale gas
exploration work, granting licenses for exploration in western
China.249
The Chinese national political climate for shale gas appears
to be positive as well. In March 2012, the first five-year shale
gas development plan for the period 2011–2015 was jointly released by the NDRC, the MOF, the Ministry of Land and Resources, and the National Agency of Energy. It called for development of a policy framework for regulation of the country’s
shale gas sector, and it ambitiously estimated that production
would reach 80 billion cubic feet in 2020 from production at the
time of zero.250 In this vein, according to the plan, China will
develop projects for the “assessment for shale and confirming
248. On the other hand, rigid environmental legislation could inhibit shale
gas exploration. This environmentally friendly over-regulation, however, does
not appear to likely to develop in China.
249. See KPMG GLOB. ENERGY INST., supra note 51, at 11.
250. “Development Plan for Shale Gas (2011-2015) (Fa Gai Neng Yuan
(2012) No. 612)” (页岩气发展规划 (2011-2015) (发改能源 (2012) 612号)).
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the current reserve estimates.”251 A National Shale Gas Development Program has been adopted, in which great importance
is given to research and development for technology, exploration, and development of shale gas in light of the Thirteenth
Five Year Plan (2016–2020), which will greatly emphasize the
importance of exploring unconventional and alternative energy
sources. As long as China is pursuing joint ventures with foreign enterprises to acquire know-how in shale gas exploration
and extraction, it seems probable that its leadership will continue to encourage shale gas commercial exploitation. An actual shale gas market is expected to develop over an extended
period of time; and although government support appears
sound, it is hard to foresee how the market will shape until major policy decisions on pricing, infrastructure development, and
competition have been announced.
It is in this context of uncertainty that we should see the
agreement signed in May 2014, in Shanghai and Russia (or rather, by the two state-owned energy companies, CNPC. It is a
thirty-year agreement that is binding on Russia to provide to
China 38 billion cubic meters of gas per year starting in
2018.252 The still uncertain forecasts for exploitation of unconventional gas necessitate an increase in imports of natural gas.
Following the agreement, China will be able to take advantage
of additional supply to meet its growing demand for natural
gas, and thus face the need to reduce the supply of coal in national energy demand, currently equal to two-thirds of it.253
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, successful shale gas development in China
would meet domestic demand, and this new resource may grant
China stronger bargaining power with gas exporters on issues
such as price, which could narrow the gap between North
American and Asian natural gas prices. The strategic signifi251. Id.
252. James Paton & Aibing Guo, Russia, China Add to $400 Billion Gas
Deal With Accord, BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK, (Nov. 10, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-10/russia-china-add-to-400billion-gas-deal-with-accord.
253. On the agreement, see Richard Weitz, The Russia-China Gas Deal:
Implications and Ramifications, WORLD AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2014,
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/russia-china-gas-deal-implicationsand-ramifications.
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cance of China in the shale gas revolution is undeniable in light
of the current rise of energy prices and struggle to reduce
harmful emissions in order to contain climate change. It remains to be seen whether this “bridge fuel” will be a viable resource capable of contributing to greater energy security, while
being developed in an environmentally sound manner in a
country with a $12 trillion economy that is deeply involved in
the global economy.

